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ABSTRACT
With the American economy stalled and another federal election campaign
season well underway, the "outsourcing" of American jobs is again on the
public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that claims for joblessness
benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-exportation has more
than doubled since the last electoral cycle. This year's political candidates
have been quick to take note. In consequence, more than at any time since
the early 1990s, continued American participation in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), in the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), and in the processes of global economic integration more
generally appear to be up for grabs.
It is not clear, on reflection, how to regard these developments from a
normative point of view. On the one hand, there seems no gainsaying that
the gradual removal of transnational trade and investment barriers have
resulted in more rapid economic growth worldwide. And that growth
appears to be lifting many once desperately poor persons out of their
erstwhile penury. Yet on the other hand, there also is no denying that global
trade and investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as conspicuous
as the gains. For many if not most of the victims of globalization are those
who till recently occupied positions much like those now coming to be
occupied by globalization's more sympathetic beneficiaries, and who climbed
out of them via precisely those legislated standards that offshoring firms now
evade. Might we pay Peter without robbing Paul?
This Article proposes an ethically and intuitively attractive answer to that
question rooted in financial engineering. The key is to channel a portion of
the globalization-wrought gains reaped by outsourcing firms to the
outsourced employees themselves. That way the latter are directly benefited
by the very processes that currently are harming them. The method proposed
is to adapt the already familiar Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") to
spread shares not simply to current labor, but now to "shadow" labor as well.
The Article also proposes means of diversifying the portfolio risk that will
face "OutsourceSOP" participants, and sketches a supporting role for such
international financial institutions as the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and the World Bank. In the long run, the Article concludes, we have
here the makings of a future "Global Shareholder Society."
3:357 (2008)
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INTRODUCTION: THE QUANDARY OF "ROBBED" PETER, PAID
PAUL, AND OVERPAID MARY1
W ITH the American economy in turmoil the "outsourcing" of American
jobs is again on the public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that
claims for joblessness benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-
exportation has more than doubled since the last electoral cycle. 2 Last year's
political candidates were quick to take note: The "middle class squeeze," and
the role of global trade and investment liberalization therein, figure
prominently in stump speeches by candidates from both major American
political parties. They are also the stuff of now nightly jeremiads by popular
news pundits.3 More than at any time since the early 1990s, continued
American participation in the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), in the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), and in the processes of
global economic integration more generally appear to be up for grabs.
1. This piece may be viewed as the latest in either or both of two series of articles devoted to
the project of financially engineering a more just and sustainable distribution of
opportunity and risk, both intra- and inter-nationally. The first internationally oriented
sequence comprises Robert Hockett, Insftitational Fixes versus Fixed Institutions, 39 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 537 (2006); Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 97 U. MINN. L. REv. 635
(2006) [hereinafter Linits of Their World]; Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of
Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal
Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93 (2005) reprinted in GIOBAlI
INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL JUSTICE (Christian Barry &
Thomas Pogge eds., 2006) [hereinafter Three Pillars]; Robert Hockett, From 'Mission-Creep"
to Gestalt-Switch: Justice, Finance, and GlobahZation's Intended Beneficiaries, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 167 (2005) [hereinafter Gestalt-Switch]; Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global
Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Effideng, and New Markets for Systemic-Income-
Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Rsk-Trading in a 'New Economy," 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
107 (2004) [hereinafter Global Aacro-Hedgind; and Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to
Mission Creep,'41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Mission Creep].
The second, more domestically oriented sequence, comprises Robert Hockett, What Kinds
of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs and '1nwnership Societies," 92
CORNELL L. REV. 865 (2007) [hereinafter What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans; Robert
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2006)
[hereinafter Hamiltonian Means]; and Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Whose Ownership?.
2. See Moming Edition: Offshoring Doubles, But Political Focus on Retraining Workers, (NPR radio
broadcast Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
stonId=87851332.
3. See, e.g., Lou DOBBS, \VAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2007). Lou DOBBS, EXPORTING
AMERICA: WHY CORPORATE GREED IS SHIPPING A.MERICAN JOBS OVERSEAS (2004). They
do appear, however, to be representative of a distinct and increasingly pronounced strain
of the present day discourse on globalization.
3:357 (2008)
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It is not clear, on reflection, how to regard these developments from a
normative point of view. For global trade and investment liberalization, when
we think carefully about them, present a quandary to those who are serious
about distributive justice and human well-being. On the one hand, there
seems no gainsaying that the gradual removal of transnational trade and
investment barriers has been resulting in more rapid economic growth
worldwide.4 That growth, moreover, appears to be lifting many once
desperately poor persons out of their erstwhile penury.5 And all of this seems
to be happening pursuant to the very dynamic that students of political
economy since the "classical" era of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill long have
predicted.6
Yet, on the other hand, there also seems no denying that global trade and
investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as conspicuous as the
gains-such as the increase in jobless claims mentioned above. These do not
seem to accrue solely, or even mainly, to complacent plutocrat rascals of the
sort long since fingered by Smith and his "public choice" school descendants,
as being ever the principal advocates of "protectionist" policies of all stripes.7
For many if not most of the "victims" of globalization nowadays seem to be
those who until recently occupied positions much like those now coming to
be occupied by globalization's more sympathetic beneficiaries-and who
climbed out of their disadvantaged positions via precisely those legislated
standards that offshoring firms now evade.8
And this is, of course, the root source of the quandary to which I refer.
For what are we to think of-how are we ethically to assess and regard-a
process that "robs," so to speak, faultless Peter to pay faultless Paul? And
symmetrically, what do we make of a status quo ante that kept faultless Paul
in his poverty while benefiting faultless Peter? Moreover, how, if at all,
should our assessment be altered if Peter is robbed not only to pay Paul, but
less sympathetic, rich Mary as well?
Now one might suggest various means by which to address the dilemma I
mention-what I will call "the assessment dilemma." One family of such
means in particular has been favored, historically, by many mainstream
economists and policy advocates since at least Bentham's day: One suggests,
for example, that we seek means of commensurating the gains and the losses
to Peters, Pauls, and Marys, then choose such policies as yield the greatest net
4. See generally Hockett, Global Macro-Hedgi; sipra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generaly Hockett, Three Pillars, siqrra note 1.
8. Id.
3:357 (2008)
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gains or least losses. Relatedly, and heuristically more convenient, one might
propose fixing on some readymade index-global gross domestic product
("GDP"), say-then select policies best calculated to "maximize" it. It is
remarkable, on reflection, how many contributors to public discussion of
globalization adopt points of view of this general type.9
I do not think, though, that proffered approaches to the assessment
dilemma of this species are apt to prove satisfactory for long, either
prudentially or ethically speaking. For as a prudential matter, perceivedly
"robbed," faultless Peters cannot plausibly be expected to acquiesce in their
"robbery" indefinitely, simply because some of the spoils assist Pauls. This
seems especially so given the Peters' own recent history of struggle to win
wealth shares from less sympathetic rich Marys, who presently appear to be
benefiting along with-and indeed more than-the Pauls at the Peters'
expense. 10  More importantly still, as an ethical matter, neither robbed
faultless Peters nor anyone else can rightfully accept, without alteration or
emendation, a systematic transfer from hypothetically faultless Peters to
undeserving Marys. At least that is so if they are truly such "faultless" Peters
and "undeserving" Marys, and if some workable, ameliorative alteration lies at
hand."1
I would like in this Article to propose and discuss one such alteration that
I think might be open to us. I propose that we add a bit of financial
irrigation, so to speak, to the processes of global trade and investment
liberalization. It is a set of financial arrangements that re-channel some of the
gains which those mentioned processes presently channel away from the
Peters to already advantaged Marys, back to those recently and now seemingly
again disadvantaged Peters. And it does so by means that are apt, in contrast
to garden variety taxation and redistribution policies, to resonate in an
9. See Hockett, Limits of Their World, supra note 1; see also Robert Hockett, Taking Dishtibution
Seriousy (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=1108217; Robert Hockett, The
Iml'ossibilioy of a Presciptive Paretian (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper 06-027, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=930460; Robert Hockett,
Whsjy Paretians Can't Prescribe: Preferences, Princples and Imperatives in Law and Economics (Cornell
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1266270.
10. See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1; see also Hockett, GlobalMaro-Hedging, spra note 1.
11. See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1; see also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra note 1;
sources cited spra note 9.
3:357 (2008)
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intuitively satisfactory way with the ethical commitments and endowment
dispositions that all of us-Peters, Pauls, and Marys alike-seem to share.' 2
We can think of what I shall propose as financial "bypass surgery," if you
like, a bit of added arterial flow to afford globalization a healthier heart. If I
am correct in my supposition, then it will mean that continued trade and
investment liberalization can be made to benefit Pauls in a manner that does
not rob Peters or Marys. That will be globalization that gives rise to less
ambiguous justice- and wealth-gains.
"Smoke and mirrors?," you might now be asking. Well, no it is finance.
Or more to the point: financial engineering. For the key to solving both our
ethical assessment dilemma and our current political stalemate over
globalization, I believe, is to channel some shares in Mary's trade- and
investment-benefited firms to the laboring Peters whom crossborder trade
and investment increasingly tend to displace. If globalization disemploys
faultless Peter, that is to say, and if only lesser paying jobs subsequently
remain to be had even after aging Peter "retools," then make Peter part-owner
of the firm that has displaced or discarded him. That way everyone not only
wins, but wins in a way that is just as immediately intuitively, as it is ethically,
attractive. This is the prospect I would like to explore.
The Article will proceed, then, as follows: Part I will first flesh out in a bit
more detail who I mean here by "Peters," "Pauls," and "Marys," as well as
what I mean by "robbed," "faultless," "deserving," and "undeserving" in
characterizing these personages. This will serve to sharpen the quandary that
I am talking about-the assessment dilemma. It also will serve to highlight
some premises that I think underwrite that quandary-premises that
empirical work can serve either partly or fully to corroborate or falsify.13
Part II will then elaborate the structure of a familiar share-spreading
prototype from which my own proposal less familiarly, but straightforwardly,
extends: I refer now to the employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP"). The
ESOP, I believe, is woefully inadequate to the task for which it was originally
embraced by the U.K. Parliament and the U.S. Congress-the provision of
income security to U.K. and U.S. laborers. But the financial structure of the
12. By "endowment dispositions" I mean certain behavioral-psychological tendencies that
behavioral economists and legal scholars have in recent years documented extensively. I
will elaborate, as well as endeavor to substantiate the claims I have just made, infra Part I
and Part II. See also Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1.
13. My proposal can accordingly be read as conditional in nature: /f/the premises drawn out
in Part I are correct-something I believe plausible but do not have space here to do
more than partly corroborate-then the proposal would seem attractive. I will provide at
least partial corroboration of the premises in this article.
3:357 (2008)
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ESOP, and that structure's resonance with a number of deep-seated justice
intuitions and behavioral-psychological dispositions of the sort mentioned
above, 14 hold at least one strong attraction. They render it a politically ideal
template from which to extend when we seek means of channeling a share of
the capital gains currently realized by firm-owners who benefit by trade and
investment liberalization, to laborers now faultlessly being displaced by the
same.
Part III and Part IV will carry out the project of analogical extension just
projected. I will proceed in two steps: Part III will show how readily the
ESOP form can be varied simply by varying the patronage relations that both
essentially define and ethically underwrite it.15 Part IV will then show how
readily laborers' displacement by globalization-facilitated outsourcing can
stand in as an ethically and endowment-intuitively compelling "shadow" form
of patronage. If I am right about this, then we will have here an elegant
means both of addressing the assessment dilemma with which I have opened
this discussion, and of winning more stakeholders in, hence supporters of,
globalization than it seems apt to keep should today's trends continue.
Part V will then briefly treat the central coordinating role that the
international financial institutions ("IFIs") both can and should take in
facilitating, and perhaps even administering, such programs as those I
propose in Part IV.16 Programs of this sort are not the only programs in
which the IFIs bear comparative advantage. They also, and not accidentally,
are precisely the sort of fare for which the IFIs-the Bretton Woods IFIs in
particular-are designed in their globalization-complementary roles. 17
Indeed, I shall argue, facilitating such programs as these would confer on the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank roles relative to
14. See supra note 9, and accompanying text.
15. By "patronage" I mean simply a sustained mode of relation between persons and firms.
See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); see also infra, Part
Ill. In the case of ESOPs, labor is the salient form of patronage. I will argue in Part III
that there are other forms, including faultlessly lost employment on the part of those
lacking in "retooling" opportunity.
16. The principal IFIs I will consider are the International Monetary Fund ('IMF") and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank,'). But much that
I shall say in Part V carries over to the missions of other IFIs, including the International
Finance Corporation ("IFC"), the African Development Bank ("ADB"), the Asian
Development Bank ("ABD'), the Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB"), and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("EBRD"). Like remarks hold of
the G-8, the OECD, and other constituent institutions of the so-called "New
International Financial Architecture" ("NIFA"). On the latter, as well as the mentioned
institutions, see Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra note 1, and infra Part V.
17. Seesmpra note 5.
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their earlier missions analogous to that of the WTO relative to its stillborn
forebear, the International Trade Organization ("ITO") envisaged in the post-
World War 1I founding era.18
In the Conclusion I will briefly address some anticipated objections and
look forward.
I. THE QUANDARY SHARPENED & DIAGNOSED, AND A SOLUTION
PROPOSED
There appear to be several widely held assumptions that lurk in the
background of much debate over globalization. And these seem not only to
underwrite the quandary itself, but to point toward the best means of
addressing the same.
The first assumption is that there is, "out there in the world," a global
endowment of "primal stuff," or of what I shall somewhat more preciously
call "ethically exogenous resources." 19 These are things nobody has produced
and thus no one can claim credit for or ultimate ethical title to. They jointly
add up to a sort of "primal given," a substrate of basic resources from which
other things valued by human beings are made.20
Informally and intuitively, we might at first pass think of this "global
stuff" as including inert and insipid material substances like petroleum,
natural gas, coal, copper, gold, magnesium-all manner of useful, hence
valued, materials to which no one initially has any more legal or ethical claim
than has anyone else. At next pass, moving outward from heuristically easy
examples like those, we can enrich the description of "global stuff' by
including what might be called "cultural deposits." Here I refer to
accumulated knowledge, practical know-how, even the languages in which we
generally think and through which we communicate.21
18. I will of course elaborate iqfra, Part V. See also Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1.
19. This is what I call them in the sources cited sepra, note 1. Some call them "luck," some
"advantage," some "resources." See id. Another name for them that I propose elsewhere
is "material opportunity." All of these variants work, but they bear the weakness of
suggesting that the user of the term is unaware that some resources and advantages are
themselves the product of responsible action on the part of the beneficiary, in which case
they are ethically endogenous and not the sort of thing that concerns us here. For
"resources," see RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRIuE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY (2000).
20. Hillel Steiner calls it the "global fund." HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 83 (1994).
21. A remarkably illuminating discussion of the global advantages conferred by birth into a
language community is found in DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE
DYNAMIcs OF GLOBALIZATION (2008).
3:357 (2008)
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All things that have been left us by our forebears, which none of us has
produced and yet many of us derive value from-hence to which none of us
bears any more prior ethical claim than she can assert in respect of newly
discovered mineral wealth-would count as cultural deposits of this kind.
These deposits too, I suspect, tend implicitly to be viewed as what I am
calling ethically exogenous. Their possession or otherwise is a matter of brute
luck. From a normative point of view, they no more properly belong to one
person than to another prior to anyone's responsible, value-adding behavior.
Access to such forms of wealth owes more to good fortune in the "birth
lottery" than to any form of creditably virtuous, value-additive activity.
Now if it is plausible to partition things in this way-to maintain that
there is some such stock of ethically exogenous yet widely valued "stuff" to
which no one bears ethical claims prior to anyone else's-then it seems fair to
suppose something else. It seems sensible to maintain that every human
person-everyone who is an appropriate subject of our ethical concern-is
entitled in justice to an equal pro rata share of this stock. That seems a
straightforward consequence of our belief that all people are, ethically
speaking, created equal-that is to say, that all are equally entitled to our
ethical concern. For such concern surely must include concern that persons
bear access to the physical stuff of which successful lives are made. Call it
"real," "material," or "substantive" concern, as distinguished from merely
"abstract" or "formal" concern.
In the case of that portion of "stuff' for the existence of which no one
now living is responsible, equal material concern of the kind I have just
mentioned must surely amount to concern for material equality. That is to
say, concern for equality of access to ethically exogenous resources and
opportunity.22 And this, I suspect, is the second working assumption that many
people attempting to think through the ethical significance of global trade and
investment liberalization operate under. We tend intuitively to think of all
human beings as bearing, by way of birthright, a right to equal opportunity-
not just formal opportunity, but "substantive," material opportunity as well.
And so we view them as bearing equal claims to whatever resources are out
there that nobody now living is actually creditable with having responsibly
brought into existence.23
The first two assumptions are of course ethical-theoretic in nature. They
serve as postulates grounded in first principles that could certainly be argued
22. For more on this, see Hockett, Taking Distibution Seriousl, supra note 9.
23. "The Creator has bestowed this manna upon all of us, equally," one might say in a more
venerable idiom.
3:357 (2008)
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about, but in connection with which argumentation will not involve appeal to
"facts on the ground." The remaining assumptions, by contrast, involve
more melding of theoretical with empirical elements.
The third assumption is that the endowment of "global stuff" to which I
have referred per the first assumption is not actually distributed equally in the
pro rata manner described per the second assumption. It just is not the case
that every person actually holds her rightful pro rata share of the world's
ethically exogenous resources.
Some people are born into wealthy countries possessed of abundant
natural and even cultural resources, the continuing in rem jurisdiction over or
title to which is largely enshrined in international law.24 Others are born into
wealthy families whose familial wealth is protected-and nowadays
decreasingly taxed-under domestic property, tort, and even constitutional
legal arrangements. 25  Still other people are faultlessly born without such
advantages, or even are born with severe handicaps for which neither
domestic nor international norms backed by force of law require or afford
compensation.2 6
Insofar as all of this is the case, there are people with more than, and
people with less than, their apparently rightful pro rata shares of the ethically
exogenous global endowment per the first two assumptions. Hence there is a
gap between our ethical "ought" intuitions and our present day "is"
impressions. So runs the third implicit assumption.
The fourth assumption amounts to a further specification of the third. It
is that we can partition the class of all persons entitled to our equal ethical
concern into the following four subclasses. Call the first class the "Ones."
These are all those who, per the second and third assumptions, hold more
than their ethically required pro rata shares. They hold more than what they
actually bear rights to hold, per the second assumption, of the ethically
exogenous "stuff." Perhaps they are born to rich families, in rich countries,
or both. They are lucky, favored by accident or fortune.
Lest I be misunderstood here, let me pause to emphasize something that
I am not suggesting. To be sure, much-even very much-of any given
One's surplus over the equal resource baseline might owe to his own laudably
24. See generaly Hockett, Limits of Their World, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. It could be argued that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights enshrine such norms.
But thus far neither the Declaration nor the Covenant appears to have been widely read-
or at any rate vindicated by state action-in so fulsome a manner. See id. It is to be
hoped-and advocated-that matters on this score will change.
3:357 (2008)
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responsible, value-additive efforts. Hence much of a particular One's surplus
might be ethically regardable as properly belonging to him. The point here is
simply that not all of it does in the case of the Ones as a whole. There are
some very fortunate people.
The remaining classes I have in mind are quickly characterizable relative
to the first. So, the second class I will call the "Twos." Twos hold more or
less pretisely their rightful pro rata shares-not substantially more and not
substantially less. Then there is another class, call them "Threes," who hold
substantially, but perhaps not dramatically less than their rightful pro rata
shares.
And finally there are those I shall call "Fours," who hold much less than
their rightful shares of the global endowment. If born into and confined to
particularly arid environments or violent and impoverished ghettos or
enclosed refugee camps, some Fours (we could even call them "Fives") might
indeed be down near to "zero," so to speak.27 And if born with severe
handicaps they might even be thought-depending upon whether we account
genetically transmitted "human resources" among the world's ethically
exogenous resources-to be "negatively" endowed. 28
Thus runs the fourth assumption. It is simply that none of the just-
defined classes -neither the Ones, Twos, Threes, or Fours-is null.29 There
are some who hold more than they have earned, others who hold more or
less precisely what they have earned, and still others who hold less than-and
in some cases dramatically less than-that which in fairness they rightfully
deserve.
Finally, there appear to be three further, more quickly characterizable
assumptions under which many who think about global trade- and
investment-liberalization tend to operate. So the fifth assumption is that the
class of Ones is roughly coextensive with the class of significant residual
claimants on, and creditors of, business firms. The Ones, that is, largely
coincide with the class of large-scale shareholders and holders of high-valued
quantities of debt securities issued by firms. They are, by and large,
substantial owners of and lenders to firms. 30 A safe corollary assumption,
27. A presently salient group of actual Fours (or even "Fives") might be those confined to the
refugee camps of Darfur, for example.
28. Insofar as handicaps are genetic and undeserved, it seems sensible to think of them as
resource-deficits in this sense. See Hockett, Taking Distribution Serious#, supra note 9.
29. The Twos could drop out of the account without loss to the principal thrust of the
argument, for reasons that will shortly become clear.
30. For extensive empirical corroboration of this point, see Hockett, What Kinds of Stock
Ounership Plans?, supra note 1, at 897-912.
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then, would be that significant portions of these peoples' portfolios are
inherited or otherwise plausibly regarded as windfalls; but we will see that no
such corollary is necessary to what I will be arguing.31
The sixth and related assumption is that the classes of Twos and Threes,
together, are roughly coextensive with the class of minimal-shareholding or
non-shareholding, but either white collar salary-earning or union-scale blue
collar wage-earning, officers or laborers for firms headquartered mainly in
countries possessed of advanced economies. These people, particularly the
high-waged and salary-earning among them, have for the most part been born
into and grown to maturity in the more or less nurturing environments of
well-to-do households and neighborhoods. They have also enjoyed access to
good educations, healthy environments, and well-functioning societies. 32
They accordingly possess much in the way of well-developed "human
capital," "cultural capital," and "social capital." But they possess dramatically
less than the Ones when it comes to inherited financial capital-creditor and
ownership interests in firms. 33
The seventh, final and again related assumption is that the class of Fours
(even "Fives," if there is such a class) is roughly coextensive with the class of
very low-wage earners, often or persistently unemployed, and subsistence
agriculturers. By far the greater part of these people, moreover, inhabit
economically underdeveloped countries without access to much in the way of
valuable material resources, inherited wealth, or even effective political,
economic, and social infrastructures or educational and other institutions.
"Social capital" and "cultural capital," we might say, are as scarce or as
maldistributed as is "natural" capital in the precincts inhabited by Fours. And
so, in consequence, is "human capital" too.34
31. There is substantial statistical evidence to the effect that the overwhelmingly greater part
of corporate securities-both equity and debt instruments-held by Americans are
inherited. See infra, Part III.
32. Again the point here is not that there are not many people who have lacked in some of
these advantages and nevertheless made successes of their lives. The point is simply that
there are many who have built such successes on the basis of good background conditions
but little if any inherited business capital.
33. The assumption here would not rule out non-negligible stock-holding and bond-
holding--either direct, indirect or beneficial-by Twos and Threes. It is simply to the
effect that these groups' ownership and creditor stakes are very much less than are those
of the Ones. For empirical corroboration of this suspicion, as well as specification of
what "direct," "indirect" and "beneficial" firm-owning are, see infra, Part III. See also
Hockett, lEhat Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 1, at 897-912.
34. See Hockett, What K'nds of Stock Ownersbip Plans?, supra note 1, at 897-912; see also Hockett,
Hamiltonian Means, supra note 1.
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Now here is the sense in which the seven assumptions just elaborated
give rise to the quandary of Peter, Paul and Mary with which I opened this
Article. If the assumptions are more or less correct or at least partly correct,
then global trade and investment liberalization will bear the following curious
attributes: first, they will tend most immediately to benefit the Ones and the
Fours-in particular, the Fours in those economically lesser developed
jurisdictions where, by hypothesis, most of the Fours live. For the firms
owned and lent to by Ones are the first beneficiaries of trade and investment
liberalization.35 And the benefits, realized largely by the hiring of desperate
Fours willing to work in unregulated environments for low wages, go
immediately to Ones. If that is correct, then the Ones are those whom I
called the "Marys" in the Introduction, and the Fours are the paid "Pauls."
Second, if the assumptions are correct, trade and investment liberalization
will tend to benefit the Ones and the Fours at the immediate expense of the
Twos and the Threes-in particular, those in the economically well-developed
jurisdictions where, by hypothesis, most of the Twos and Threes live. For as
firms realize growing profits by avoiding the labor, environmental, and other
regulatory standards that once constrained them in the developed
jurisdictions, 36 then the following fact obtains: the formerly salaried and
higher-waged officers and other employees of these firms-Twos and Threes
- lose increments of salary, wage, and other benefits. And these latter were
won decades ago through precisely such domestic labor and employee benefit
legislation as globalization now enables the firms-and the Ones who own
and finance them-to evade. 37 So the Twos and Threes will be those whom I
labeled "Peters" in the Introduction. They now largely finance the gains
realized by the Pauls and the Marys. 38
But now if all of this is so, then it means that global trade and investment
liberalization as presently conceived and executed are inherently afflicted with
an acute ethical ambiguity, if not a full-blown indeterminacy. And it is
precisely this ambiguity, I think, that ultimately accounts for the difficulty
described in the Introduction-the quandary that many of us tend to
experience in attempting to determine whether globalization is a good thing
35. See Hockett, Three Pillars, siara note 1; see also Hockett, Global Macm-Hedging supra note 1.
36. It would happen, of course, in any of several familiar ways. Firms in the developed world
would outsource or threaten to outsource to less regulated jurisdictions. Firms in the
developing and less regulated world, for their parts, would export to the once-regulated
developed world, and would do so cheaply by dint of the costs saved via non-regulation.
And of course the latter course strengthens the force of the former course.
37. 1 am ignoring longer-term "rising tides lift all boats" type claims for the moment.
38. See snpra note 35.
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or not, and thus what kinds of conditions, if any, should be imposed upon
continued trade and investment liberalization.
Here, more precisely, is what I mean. Insofar as we are able plausibly to
restrict comparison to Ones on the one hand, Twos and/or Threes on the
other, simply leaving Fours out of account in a sort of ethical blindspot, there
is a straightforward ethical loss in the case of global trade and investment
liberalization. At least that is so in the short term, and probably it is so for
the long term as well in view of individuals' "retooling" costs (costs of
education to perform other jobs) and the relatively brief length of a working
life.39 If we fail to consider the Fours, that is-if we ignore the desperately
poor, most of whom operate outside of the advanced economies-it seems
pretty clear that globalization is a bad thing. We are benefiting the Ones at
the expense of the Twos and the Threes. And by hypothesis, per the
assumptions elaborated above, the Ones are already overendowed, the Twos
are at best adequately endowed, and the Threes are underendowed. So
redistributing from the Twos and the Threes to the Ones yields a
straightforward loss of justice. I suspect that many opponents of trade and
investment liberalization, at least those who oppose it without any misgivings,
think along these lines. It is the Fours who are obscured, in their thinking, by
an ethical blindspot. 40
Now if, by contrast, we restrict comparison to the Twos and/or Threes
on the one hand, the Fours on the other, leaving the Ones out of account in
the ethical blindspot, then we face the prospect of an unambiguous sort of
justice gain wrought by global trade and investment liberalization. For the
"degree" of global injustice-the justice-shortfall, so to speak-can be viewed
in this case as now being partly made up. Ethically exogenous "global stuff"
is more nearly equalized between Twos, Threes, and Fours; whereas before,
the Twos were by dint of mere luck better off than the Threes, who by dint
of mere luck were better off than the Fours. And if we have forgotten about
the Ones, this greater degree of equalization-which, again, is equalization
only of that which by hypothesis is ethically required to be equalized, ethically
exogenous "global stuff"-will perforce be viewed as a straightforward
justice-gain.
39. See, e.g., Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, snpra note 1.
40. It might also be argued, of course, that they ignore the lowering of prices, which benefits
"everybody." I do not think that's a very good argument, though-precisely because
"everyone" benefits in this sense. The benefit here is quite thinly spread, whereas the
harms that these people are concerned about are quite thickly concentrated--on precisely
the wrong people. He who loses his income and cannot retool is not consoled by the fact
that his poisonous toothpaste or his child's toxic toy now will cost pennies less.
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Now it seems to me that it is indeed the Ones whom we tend to forget
when those who advocate or defend global trade and investment liberalization
say, "Well, think about all those desperate global poor." These people are of
course partly right. We should be thinking about the desperate global poor-
those I have been calling the Fours. But the Ones are left out of our account in
this case, and they should not be if our justice-accounting is to be complete.
On the other hand, people also are right when they say, in effect, "Well,
what about the local Threes, who would be Fours had it not been for the
gains we have made in regulatory development, in labor legislation, and the
like since only the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in the
'developed' countries? They should not be left out of our account either."
And of course these people also are right. And the fact that both sides are right
in respect of their distinct, but incomplete and non-coextensive
constituencies, while both sides are wrong in respect of the those spheres when
considered together, is the cause of the quandary. It is the root of the
assessment dilemma.
Now, if I am right about this, then we are faced both with a challenge of
vision and, yet more urgently, a challenge of action. For if my diagnosis is
correct, then the only way adequately to address the quandary seems to be,
first, to keep all relevant parties-the Ones, Twos, Threes and Fours-
simultaneously in view when assessing and structuring global trade and
investment liberalization. And second, to seek means of ensuring that Ones
but not Fours share the gains wrought by trade and investment liberalization
with Twos and, especially, Threes.
Note that the second task is in a sense yet more urgent than the first.
That is because, unless we can find means by which Ones share their gains
with the Twos and the Threes, there seems no way of acting upon the first
task. That is to say, unless we discharge the second task, we shall never
escape the assessment dilemma. For the latter amounts to a case of ethical
indeterminacy wrought by incomplete specification of the assessment
domain. Either the Ones or the Fours are missing from any horn of the
dilemma. And there just seems to be no way to judge, under the aspect of
justice, when a justice gain (simply a change such as renders a distribution
more just) wrought by transfers from Twos or Threes to Fours is swamped
by a justice loss wrought by simultaneous transfers from Twos or Threes to
Ones.41
41. One might seek to escape the prescriptive indeterminacy by falling back upon a
maximizing rule, of course, as countenanced above in the Introduction; but then one will
have relinquished the effort to conform one's prescriptions to what is distributivelyjust.
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Unless, then, we design practical means of connecting global Ones to
global Twos and Threes, we are effectively attempting to deal with a trivalent
ethical problem by means of a two-variable formula. Only by adding a
variable do we render the problem soluble. And only in that way,
accordingly, do we ensure that globalization might constitute a
straightforward ethical gain. Our pressing normative-theoretical problem that
is the assessment dilemma, that is, appears soluble only by practical means.
We must embark on a project of institutional design. 42
Now I think, per this last observation, that we do have the requisite
"connective tubing" at hand. The institutions that we must design are
financial in nature. Ours is a task of financial engineering. It is financial
engineering on behalf not simply of large firms in this case, but on behalf of
ordinary folk now-Twos and Threes-as well. In the remainder of this
Article, then, I will undertake to schematize what I have in mind here. The
key is to start with a familiar means by which the United Kingdom and
United States already endeavor to make "capital"-owners of "laborers," to
employ the classical terminology, and then to adapt the structure to our
present purpose. I will do that in Part II through Part IV. Then in Part V
will seek to explain why the proposal amounts to an ideal means by which the
Bretton Woods IFIs can play precisely that WTO-complementary role which
the founders of all three institutions envisaged now well over sixty-odd years
ago.43
II. A SUGGESTIVE BUT INCOMPLETE PROTOTYPE: THE EMPLOYEE
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN
Intriguingly, Americans and Britons have made some tentative efforts at
making capital-owners of laborers. The principal means up to now has been
the public favoring-mainly the tax-favoring-of employee benefit plans. In
the United States, that is done via the Employee Retirement Income Security
42. The fuller significance of institutional design as means of more adequately addressing
normative- theoretical problems is discussed fully in Hockett, Taking Distribulion Seriousl,
supra note 9. This role of the practical in solving even theoretical problems should not be
surprising when it is normative theory that is under consideration. For normative theory
is always at bottom about action. Normative theory, that is, is a species of what since
Aristotle's day we have called "practical reason." See Robert Hockett, Why Parelians Can't
Prescribe, supra note 9.
43. I am of course treating the World Trade Organization as the embodiment, more or less,
of what the Bretton Woods founders envisaged for the then planned International Trade
Organization, which had to wait fifty years for its effective implementation. See generally
Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1.
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Act ("ERISA").44 Yet the ultimate aim here, as ERISA's full tide suggests,
has been mainly to encourage and protect investment for one limited
purpose-retirement security.45
There is one partial exception, however. The employee stock ownership
plan, or ESOP, was originally designed, and continues to be advocated, at
least partly as a means of fostering the pre-retirement owning of firms by
employees. For a number of reasons that I describe elsewhere and that many
others as well have explained, that is an over-modest aim.46 But here I shall
be concerned more with how the aim is affected, and why we seem willing to
affect it in the manner we do. For the mechanics and politics here would
appear to be generalizable in ways that might benefit all of those whom I have
been calling "Twos" and, especially, "Threes." I plan to exploit that
generalizability below.
A preliminary point regarding terminology will be helpful before we
proceed. In speaking of ESOPs (or "Plans"), one can refer to any of several
distinct but related kinds of financial arrangements. 47 All, as befits their
shared name and as intimated above, are meant to facilitate laborers'
acquisition of shares in the firms for which they work.4 8 Easily the most
common such set of arrangements, however, and the one that we will exploit
here, is the so-called "leveraged" ESOP.49 This, as the qualifier suggests, is
the plan that employs credit in the share-acquiring process.5 o
44. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C.5 1001 et seq.;
see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
68-84 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the origin and structure of ERISA). I ignore here such
proposals as that to diminish or even eliminate capital gains taxation. Such proposals
appear to be aimed at-and doubtless would have the effect of-more rewarding of those
who already own than fostering wider ownership.
45. Congressional action culminating in the passage of ERISA was precipitated by the folding
of the Studebaker corporation, which, it was subsequently discovered during bankruptcy
proceedings, had grossly underfunded, and indeed "raided," its employee pension fund,
leaving the suddenly unemployed pensioners doubly bereft. See LANGBE1NG & ,VOLK,
sipra note 44. Those familiar with recent bankruptcies, particularly in the airline industry,
might be tempted to say plis fa change. See, e.g., Evan Parez, Delta Moves to Shed Pensions,
WALL. ST.J., June 20, 2006, at A13.
46. See Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans?, supra note 1, at 914-24.
47. For a brief catalogue of ESOP types, see JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASi, EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 64-84 (1988).
48. See id. at 64.
49. See id. at 68-78.
50. The principal non-credit-employing ESOPs-so-called "non-leveraged ESOPs," "tax-
credit ESOPs ("TRASOPs") and "payroll ESOPs" ("PAYSOPs")-are briefly elaborated
in BLASi. Id.
3:357 (2008)
HeinOnline -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 374 2008
Insource the Shareholding of Outsourced Employees
A. What They Do
Here is what the leveraged ESOP does, and how it does it.5 An
employing firm adopts an ESOP as a sponsored ERISA defined contribution
plan. 52 Like other such plans, the ESOP takes the form of a trust.53 It is a
legally distinct entity formed to acquire and hold stock on behalf of
employees. Its administrator, though named and directed by the sponsoring
firm's board or a committee named thereby,5 4 accordingly bears fiduciary
obligations to those employees.55
Now partly in exchange for a promissory note, the trust borrows funds
from a bank or other commercial lender. 56 It uses the funds to purchase
stock issued by the sponsoring or employing firm at fair market value.57 The
loan proceeds thus pass through the ESOP to the sponsoring or employing
firm itself-they finance it, as we shall see-and the stock is then held on
behalf of the employees. The firm guarantees repayment of the loan by the
ESOP to the lender, and the stock held in the ESOP is pledged as security.
51. The transactions which follow are related, in slightly differing order and somewhat less
detail, in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTIT., FUNDAMIENTALS OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 121-22 (3d ed. 1987).
52. See 29 U.S.C. 1107(d)(6) (2000) (defining an employee stock ownership plan under
ERISA). Defined contribution (DC) plans are to be distinguished from so-called defined
benefit (DB) plans. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., sapra note 51, at 65. The
former prescribe a schedule of payments made into an account for the benefit of the
employee, who in turn bears both "upside" gains and "downside" losses realized by her
investment portfolio over time. See id. DB plans, by contrast, prescribe payments made
out to the employee upon her retiring, and the employing firm-or the insurance
company from whom the firm purchases annuities on behalf of its employee
beneficiaries-in effect bears the aforementioned upside gains and downside losses
realized by the fund out of which payments are made. See id. at 68-69.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (a) (2000). The idea, of course, is both to insulate funds earmarked
for employees from the other financial operations of the firm, and to afford the employee
beneficiaries the benefit of fiduciary obligations owed them by the plan's trustee. See id. S
1104. It is regrettably not clear, however, that the trust protections offered employees by
pension trusts are as fulsome as those offered beneficiaries of other trusts. See, e.g., In re
WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp.2d 745, 757-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that ERISA defines
"fiduciaries," "fiduciary functions" and "fiduciary duties" more narrowly than does
common law trust doctrine).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 403(a)(1) (2000). A partial exception, which need not here detain us, is found
at 29 U.S.C. § 403(a)(2) (2000).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (2000).
56. 1 say "partly" for reasons that will be made plain over the next several sentences.
57. Because the shares are purchased at fair market value, the purchase is sometimes
misleadingly described by ESOP-proponents as an equity-injection. We will see that what
actually happens is publicly subsidized debt finance accompanied by a stock giveaway.
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Over time, the sponsoring or employing firm makes cash contributions
to the ESOP, just as it would do in connection with any defined contribution
plan. In this case the contributions are used by the ESOP to amortize the
loan used to purchase the sponsoring or employing firm's shares.58 As the
loan is paid down, stock held by the trust is gradually released from its loan-
securing role to individual accounts maintained severally on behalf of the
employee or beneficiaries.5 9 It is released to those accounts in proportions
that track the beneficiaries' labor-patronage of the firm (their wages or
salaries). Diagrammatically:









58. So the sponsoring or employing firm is, in effect, both borrowing and paying back on
behalf of employees for the purchase of its own stock-it gives out partial ownership of
itself as an employee benefit. There's the dilution (of previous owners), more on this will
be discussed presently.
59. Typically the shares become saleable or redeemable only upon retirement or exit of the
firm, and typically the firm buys them back. There are voting restrictions (even to the
vanishing point) as well, as we will see presently. That is all significant when it comes to
the question of just what "owning" should mean here; but this is not our question in this
Article. For more on that question, see Hockett, Whose Ownership?, sipra note 1
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Not surprisingly, in view of its financial structure, 60 this set of
arrangements proves to work well as a method of getting more capital to
labor (and, we shall see, more debt financing to the firm). Some statistics are
telling. By 1986, twelve years after ESOPs had attained congressional
endorsement in ERISA, nearly five thousand firms had adopted plans. 61
About twenty-five percent of those plans held more than twenty-five percent
of the outstanding stock of their firms, and nearly two percent of them
owned all such stock.62 By 1990, over twelve million laborers-about ten
percent of the workforce-in over ten thousand firms had come to
participate in ESOPs. 63
By the late 199 0 s, ESOPs were estimated to account for just under four
percent of corporate equity-holding in the United States.64 The rate of ESOP
growth, moreover, by this point had come to average between three- and six-
hundred new plans per year, accounting for between three- and six-hundred-
thousand new employee participants per year.65 Among sponsoring firms
over the past thirty years have been such American stalwarts as Avis, the
Chicago Tribune, Delta, Federal Express, General Motors, Kraft, Maytag,
Polaroid, Procter & Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines and Xerox. 66
60. With one possible-though minimal---caveat to be noted below, the employee or
beneficiaries neither pay nor pledge anything. The firm, in effect, does it all. Or nearly
all, as we will see when we turn to the government's role.
61. See HENRY HANSMAN, sora note 15, at 105.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id.; UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNXERSHIP 10-11, 20 (Corey Rosen & Karen
M. Young eds., 1991); THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPs IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 23-27
(Karen M. Young ed., 1990); DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED
FIRM 110 (1990). ESOP-like structures have made significant headway in non-U.S.
jurisdictions as well. See Rosen & Young, op. ti., and ELLERMAN, op. tit.. A helpful
catalogue of the one thousand largest firms with more than four percent employee
ownership is found in JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASi & DOUGLAS LYNN KRUSE, THE NEW
OWNERS 257-301 (1991). The catalogue does not disaggregate employee ownership by
ESOP, profit-sharing, 401(k) and option plans, but is nonetheless suggestive in light of
both (a) ESOPs accounting for just shy of half of employee-owned equity, and (b) the
surprising number of firms on the list that are twenty or more percent employee-owned.
64. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, STATISTICAL PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP (1997). The Center estimates that nine percent of equity is employee-owned,
with profit-sharing, 401 (k) and stock option plans accounting for the non-ESOP balance.
It should be noted that about four percent of ESOPs are estimated to be terminated each
year. Id.
65. id.
66. Rosen & Young, supra note 63, at 10-11; Young, sipra note 63.
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Even skeptics of ESOPs, and of the oft-seemingly "crackpot" financial
pronouncements of the ESOP's inventor, Louis Kelso,67 readily acknowledge
their "rapid proliferation," 68 hence that "[s]omething is happening that
requires attention. '69 But what really is happening, and why might it require
attention? What do the telling statistics actually tell?
ESOP promoters have spoken of ESOPs' successes as though all were a
natural function of superior financial engineering, the "self-liquidation" of
"capital mortgages," and the incentive effects that growing ownership stakes
impart to workers. Thus Louis Kelso once said, "the corporation and its
employees can achieve [through ESOP-financing] several hundred percent
greater efficiency in the use of corporate earnings for capital purposes than
through conventional . . .financing. '70 Kelsonian acolyte Stuart Speiser has
said, "[the] new capital ... pay[s]for itself out of the increased profits flowing
from expanded production. '71 The ever-perky business journal, Inc., assures
us that "there's considerable evidence that eliminating the employee mentality
and creating companies of businesspeople, of owners, has become a kind of
Hidden Secret of Success in the American marketplace. '72
But the mentioned evidence is hardly "considerable." It is thin and
ambiguous. 73 Nor does presently leverage-bought ESOP capital "pay for
itself" in much more than a trivial sense. It is far from clear that the dividend
streams and/or capital gains that attend ESOP stock would dependably pay
off the term loans without help of the kind we shall presently describe. And
the "several hundred percent greater efficiency," which quantity is, like many
67. Kelso routinely announced such putative discoveries as that "Say's Law" is being
"violated" in modern capitalist economies, that contemporary economists remain wedded
to the labor theory of value, and that there are "two factors" that enter into production-
capital and labor-with the first of those accounting for an ever-growing share of value-
added. See generally Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 1, at 124-42. Economists do
not appear to have found these discoveries compelling. Perhaps I should not be as
"snarky" as I might seem here. Kelso's motives, energy and inventiveness, as
distinguished from his sallies into theory, were nothing if not worthy of praise. Also, he
was a laxwver and investment banker, not an academic theorist, typically pitching his
advocacy to legislators and the general public rather than fellow-theorists. See generaly
Speiser, infra note 71.
68. HANSMANN, supra note 15, at 105.
69. ELLERMAN, supra note 63, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
70. Louis 0. KELSO & PATICIA HEITER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER 62
(1986).
71. Stuart Speiser, Broadened Capital Ownershi---tbe Solution to Major Domestic and International
Problems, 7 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 426, 429 (1985) (emphasis added).
72. John Case, A Comlpany of Business People, INC., Apr. 1993, at 79.
73. See BLASI, stora note 47, at 25--27, 221-38 (1988) for plenary-and not unsympathetic-
discussion of what evidence there is.
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Kelsonian magnitudes, arrived at by unspecified means, is hardly "natural,"
"economic" or "financial" in any pre-legal or pre-political senses of the terms.
The real "Hidden Secret of [EOPS] Success," it turns out, is no more
obscure than the tax code, ERISA, and combined corporate governance and
takeover law. The leveraged ESOP is essentially a public benefit conferred
through private channels.
B. How They Do It
Consider first a few tax and ERISA advantages. These, working together,
account both for the aforementioned "greater efficiency" of ESOPs as
financing tools, and for ESOP stock's illusory capacity to "pay for itself."
They also afford incentives to the lenders themselves, as well as to non-ESOP
shareholders from whom an ESOP might seek shares.
1. The Tax Advantages
Probably the most effective tax advantage that leveraged ESOPs uniquely
confer upon sponsoring/employing/issuing firms comes via the Internal
Revenue Code's permitting them to deduct contributions made to their plans.
The firm may deduct those, to an amount up to twenty-five percent of all
compensation paid a plan's participants, from its taxable income.74 That
advantage works jointly with ERISA's relaxing, in the case of ESOPs, the
now mandatory diversification understanding of the so-called "prudent
investor" standard to which employee pension trusts ordinarily are subject. In
non-ESOP cases, ERISA requires that employee trusts be broadly invested; a
plan will not typically be permitted to hold much of the sponsoring firm's
equity.75 Yet ESOPs are exempted from this standard. 76 That means that the
firm which sponsors a leveraged ESOP can eat the cake and keep the penny.
74. I.R.C. § 404 (2000). ESOPs enjoy other tax advantages enjoyed by employee pensions
more generally, most of which are noted below, but our focus will nevertheless be
primarily upon what is unique to ESOPs.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(C).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2). At least that is ordinarily the case. Courts have in some instances
agreed with the Department of Labor that there can be circumstances in which the
prudent investor standard would require the ESOP trustee to refrain from purchasing
employer stock. See, e.g., Hemlan v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cit. 1997);
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cit. 1995); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir.
1995). It should also be pointed out that any other assets in which the ESOP might
invest remain subject to the general diversification requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1).
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It enjoys the tax favor bestowed upon contributions to its ERISA plans, by
further financing itself through new share issuance.
Now the aforementioned "further financing"-the "purchase" of newly
issued shares by the legally distinct trust for the employees-as noted, is
leveraged. But that simply means that the firm is effectively financing itself
with debt while enjoying a publicly afforded tax break in doing so, in return
for affording employees new stock. And, as it happens, the lender supplying
the leverage for ESOPs is tax-favored, too. Ordinarily, its taxable income is
the interest received on lent funds. 77 But on a loan to a leveraged ESOP, fifty
percent of that interest historically has been excluded. 78 So the legislated
favors conferred upon ESOPs amount to government-subsidized debt-
financing of ESOP-sponsoring firms, in a manner intended to encourage
those firms to make partial firm-owners of firm-employees.
But there is more. Ordinarily, dividends paid out to the holders of firms'
shares are drawn from firms' after-tax incomes. 79 Dividends paid on the
stock held in an ESOP, by contrast, are deductible from taxable corporate
income.80 Capital gains reaped by the trust also go untaxed; they are deferred
compensation. 81  The tax code also affords incentives to non-ESOP
shareholders to transfer their shares to the ESOP. For one thing, under
specified conditions a shareholder in the sponsoring firm who sells shares to
the ESOP may defer any taxable gain that she gleans through the sale.82 For
another thing, fifty percent of the proceeds from sale of a sponsoring firm's
stock to its ESOP are excludable from estate taxation.83 And finally, a
decedent's estate may avoid tax-induced liquidity problems by shedding a
portion of its estate tax liability to an ESOP, provided that it convey to that
ESOP shares in the sponsoring firm of equal value in exchange. 84
77. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2000)(including "interest" in the general definition of gross income).
78. I.R.C. § 133(a) (2000). But see Small Business Job Protection Act § § 1602(a), 1602(c)
(repealing the interest exclusion previously allowed under I.R.C. § 133(a) for all securities
acquisition loans made after August 20, 1996, except for loans made pursuant to a binding
written contract which was in effect before June 10, 1996).
79. This is true "by definition," so to speak- consider the Internal Revenue Code's
definition of corporate taxable "income." See I.R.C. § 311(a) (2000) (providing that a
corporation may not deduct dividends from its gross income).
80. I.R.C. § 404 (k) (2000).
81. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c), (d) (2000). This advantage is not unique to ESOPs as distinguished
from other ERISA plans.
82. I.R.C. § 1042 (2000). Among the conditions are that proceeds of the sale must be
reinvested within one year in a domestic corporation, and that after the sale the ESOP will
own at least thirty percent of the sponsoring firm's shares.
83. I.R.C. § 2057 (2000).
84. 1.R.C. § 2210 (2000).
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2. Further ER[SA Advantages
There are further ERISA advantages, in addition to the just described tax
advantages, designed to encourage ESOP share-acquisitions from non-ESOP
shareholders in the sponsoring firm. Pension plans ordinarily are barred from
purchasing sponsoring firms' shares not only from the sponsoring firms
themselves, but from all so-called "parties in interest." Those include
directors, officers and principal shareholders.8 5 But ERISA exempts ESOPs
from that standard. 6 And ESOPs also may borrow from such parties in
interest in order to acquire employing firm stock.8 7
3. Governance Advantages
There is yet more to the public benefit story than tax and ERISA
inducement. A cluster of governance advantages offered by ESOPs, in this case
working through (once again publicly afforded) corporate and securities law,
offers incumbent managers and otherwise satisfied shareholders8 8 an added
array of incentives. First, the firm's immediate issuance of new shares to a
nominally independent, "third party" ESOP dilutes more than the monetary
value of older shares: It dilutes older shares' voting power as well.8 9 That
makes it harder for unsolicited would-be acquirers to assemble a controlling
bloc of shares. And this issuance can be immediate from a legal standpoint,
indeed even in express contemplation of an impending takeover bid. So has
held the Delaware Chancery. 90
Were new employee/owners reliable voting allies of would-be firm-
acquirers, of course, the ESOP's promise as a takeover defense would be
attenuated. But as it happens the new employee/owners are not such reliable
allies at all; indeed quite the contrary. And employee preferences scarcely
matter in these cases in any event, for the new employee/beneficiaries of
85. I.R.C. § 4975 (2000).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 408(e) (2000).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 408(b)(3) (2000); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3) (2000).
88. Including many newly owning employees, were they able to vote their shares. More on
this "were they" presently.
89. I say "nominally" independent here partly owing to the role of the sponsoring firm's
board in selecting and directing, indeed even functioning as, the ESOP trustee-see note
105, irnfra--and partly owing several ESOP governance features to be noted.
90. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Coro., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch., 1989). But see NCR
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 761 F.Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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leveraged ESOPs do not typically receive voting rights, at least not at once.91
That itself constitutes, of course, another incentive for ESOP-creation, an
incentive enjoyed by the managers. ESOPs work to free managers' hands
from such dissatisfied shareholders-including any employee shareholders-
as there might be. So it seems more than likely that the ESOP's utility in
warding off takeovers, and its strengthening managerial hands, also might
account in significant measure for ESOPs' proliferation. And that utility
itself, again, like the favorable tax and ERISA treatment, amounts to a public
benefit. It is sanctioned and indeed affirmatively encouraged by legislation
and court decision alike.
4. A Telling Counte factual
It surely is not objectionable, then, to suggest that the legislative and
judicial favoring of ESOPs-hence ESOPs' amounting to a public benefit-
might be playing a role in their spread. 92 But we can sharpen and supplement,
as well as summarize, the point here by appeal to a stylized scenario.
Suppose there is no tax- or ERISA-favoring of finance of the firm
through the ESOP; the same loan on the same terms can be had by other
means. Assume also that ESOPs offer no governance or takeover-avoidance
91. A few details will be in order here. Most stock held by ESOPs considered in aggregate is
non-voting stock. The median ESOP holds ten percent of its sponsoring firm's shares,
but only five percent of that firm's voting rights. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX
INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP 39-40 (1986). How can this be?
First, partition the class of ESOPs into those sponsored by closely held, and those
sponsored by publicly traded, firms. Now consider the first of those subclasses. With
little exception, closely held sponsoring firms enjoy all applicable ESOP tax benefits even
if their ESOPs do not pass acquired stock voting rights through to
employee/beneficiaries. The only exception is in respect of voting as to "fundamental"
transactions-matters which must, according to charter or applicable law, be decided by
supermajorities of outstanding shares voted. I.R.C. §5 409(e)(3) (2000), 401 (a)(22) (2000).
Next, the second subclass: While in the case of publicly held firms voting rights must in
fact be passed through to the employee/beneficiaries, that is so only in respect of stock
actually allocated to employee accounts. I.R.C. § 4975(e) (7) (2000). But the allocation
occurs only gradually as the original loan is amortized. Note also that this lack of control
rights ought to give pause to those who would see in the current "ESOP revolution" any
real harbinger of an incipient "workplace democracy." The aptness to ESOPs in
particular, of the concerns raised by Professor Alexander in connection with
contemporary pension practice more generally, is perhaps troublingly ironic. See
Alexander, supra note 62 passim.
92. 1 am by no means the first to suggest the importance of public support for the spread.
See, e.g., BLASI, supra note 63; HANSMANN, supra note 15; ELLELIAN, supra note 63; and
sources cited infra, note 98.
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advantages. Suppose further that employees do not temper their wage
demands by dint of their ESOP benefit; their new shares are "all gravy." And
finally suppose that our laborers' gradually growing "ownership" does not
appreciably boost shopfloor morale hence productivity and firm-profitability.
Under these circumstances, what is happening in Figure 1, above? The
firm, via the ESOP, is financing its projects by borrowing and repaying, and
while at it happens to be issuing new stock to employees who pay nothing.
But that means the value of pre-ESOP shares is diluted by the value of the
newly issued ESOP shares, with no offsetting advantages enjoyed by the pre-
ESOP shareholders. Why do the latter not object?
There are less proximate political answers to which we shall turn in a
moment. But the more immediate reason of course is that several of the
suppositions just made, as we have seen, do not obtain. There are
considerable tax, ERISA, and governance advantages gleaned through
ESOPs. There is also some evidence that employees do temper wage
demands in view of the ESOP benefit-that there might even be an implicit
bargain to this effect- but this can be no more than a small part of the
story.
9 3
Only the supposition that growing ownership fails to make much
difference to productivity appears, in the light of what evidence we have, to
be by and large correct. So the tax, ERISA and governance advantages-the
cluster of public benefits-enjoyed by ESOPs must be critical to their spread.
Pre-ESOP shareholders, at least the less other-regarding ones,94 are willing to
endure the dilution of their shares wrought by leveraged ESOP transactions.
They are willing to do so precisely because the now much more cheaply
(because of tax- and ERISA advantages) debt-financed firm is sufficiently
more valuable, in consequence, as wholly or partly to offset the dilution. And
to what ever degree those shareholders are not wholly compensated in this
manner, the control benefits imparted by ESOPs to management make up
93. For one thing, the evidence is scant. See BLASI, slnpra note 63, at 263; ELLERMAN, supra
note 63, at 91. Perhaps more importantly, as a theoretical matter it seems highly unlikely
that rational employees would be willing to reduce their wages sufficiently to offset the
dilution. The diluting shares issued them are, after all, deferred compensation. And as we
will see they confer none of the consumption benefits of control. And finally, of course,
they are undiversified investments. It would be far more sensible for employees who
were willing to sacrifice pay for stock to insist upon voting, and/or diversified stock,
hence not to offer any sacrifices sufficient to offset the dilution of their own firms'
owners' stock.
94. The other-regarding ones might partly be actuated by the ideological/political
motivations.
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the difference. Any dissatisfied shareholders are weakened by the court-
sanctioned ESOP transactions.
C. Why We Like Them
So then assuming that law-conferred tax, ERISA and governance benefits
constitute a, if not the, critical reason for ESOPs' proliferating, we are faced
with another question. Why is this public favoring of ESOPs politically
accepted in the United States? Does not the support tamper with "natural"
market forces, and is not distortion of this sort disfavored? 95 It is here that
we-or at any rate those who would seek to render global trade and
investment liberalization more unalloyedly just-shall find the successes of
ESOPs instructive. For there are mutually reinforcing ideological and
endowment-psychological reasons that appear to account for the U.S. public
favoring of ESOPs, and even indeed for the private favoring of ESOPs as
well.
1. Core Values. Rerponsibiliy & Equal Opportuniy
The key to the ESOP's political success probably lies in its giving
expression to a cluster of interlinked ethical-cum-political values and
endowment-psychological dispositions that are shared by a broad swath of
Americans and, one suspects, persons worldwide. 96 Values-wise, we are by
and large opportunity-egalitarian in our commitments: 97 We believe that what
people have should ideally be traceable to equal initial holdings of such
ethically exogenous resources-favors of fortune, of chance or mere
circumstance, the "global stuff" of Part I-as no one now living is
responsible for having created. 98 And we believe that departures from that
95. Certainly some seem to think so. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey,
ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 HARV. J. LEGIS. 103 (1986); Michael W. Melton,
Demythologi!ing ESOPs, 45 TAx L. REv. 363 (1990).
96. For more on the invariance of these dispositions across cultures and subcultures, see, for
example, Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theogy of Justice, 26
CAPDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005); see also Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriousy, supra note 1.
97. See Hockett, Whose Ownerhsip?, supra note 1, at 31-51; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, spra
note 1, at 57-68. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
98. See Hockett, lWhose Ownerhsip?, supra note 1, at 31-51; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, spra
note 1, at 57-68. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
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baseline ideally would be the product of value-additive or-detractive
effort-of choice rather than chance-for which people are responsible.99
It is tempting to think of access to value-adding opportunity-hence to
business capital as well as to dwelling space and basic human capital-as part
of that ethically exogenous endowment to which all should ideally enjoy
access.100 Ethical intuitions such as these, I conjecture, underwrite the first
several assumptions that I noted in Part I to be implicit in the thinking of
many of us who find globalization ethically perplexing.
2. Endowment Dispositions: Loss Aversion & 'Handout"Aversion
Endowment-psychological dispositions-wise, we are apt to experience
some methods of redressing imbalances in the distribution of that
aforementioned exogenous endowment as less discomfiting than others. 01
So, for example, our more self-regarding, less altruistic selves are apt to be
friendlier toward distributing perceivedly "new" resources to the presently
underendowed, than toward "taking" already held resources for redistributive
purposes. 0 2 Those same selves will regard a perceived "refraining from
taking" from the underendowed as preferable to a mere "giving" to the
same. 10 3 And finally, the self-regarding will be more amenable to any
perceived "giving" to the degree that it can be framed more as a rewarding-
hence as ethically endogenized, that is earned or deserved by the recipient.10 4
3. How the SOP Structure Gives Expression to Our Values and Disposiions
The leveraged ESOP coheres rather neatly with these values and
dispositions. It spreads a basic endowment which it is not difficult to view as
99. See Hockett, Whose Ownerhsip?, supra note 1, at 31-51; Hockett, Hamilloian Means, supra
note 1, at 57-68. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
100. See Hockett, Whose Ownersip?, supra note 1, at 31-51; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, slo~ra
note 1, at 57-68. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
101. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, snpra note 1, at 58-72, 80-87; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means,
sio ra note 1, at 73-83.
102. I employ scare-quotes here to register the fact that the "newness" and "taking" in
question are experienced as such pre-reflectively, as their proceeding from cognitive
dispositions would suggest. We are speaking of predisposed framings here rather than
considered judgments. See Hockett, Whose Ownerhsip?, supra note 1, at 31-51; Hockett,
Hamiltonian Means, supra note 1, at 57-68. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
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being, at least in part or potential, ethically exogenous. 105 It spreads that
endowment by distributing what can saliently, if nevertheless superficially, be
viewed as "new" capital-newly issued shares in firms. 106 It does that partly
in what resembles a return for reward-earning effort-labor patronage or
work for the firm.107 And it encourages such rewarding (on the part of
lenders and otherwise-diluted shareholders) largely by refraining from
perceived taking (that is, through tax breaks) rather than transparent taking
and giving.
In a way, then, the leveraged ESOP replicates, in piecemeal and
somewhat more convoluted fashion, the same strategies that the United
States has employed more elegantly in connection with publicly facilitated
home-spreading and education-spreading since the early mid-twentieth
century. 10 8 And this appears to be no accident. For there is considerable
historical evidence suggesting that the ESOP was expressly inspired by the
federal home finance programs set in place over the 1930s and 1940s.10 9
There is also good evidence to the effect that both these and the federal
education finance programs set in place over the 1960s and 1970s were found
appealing to legislators and public alike precisely in owing to their resonance
with the values and dispositions just rehearsed. 10
But then this raises a further question. Might the idea of the leveraged
ESOP itself be "leveraged" yet further, in a manner that enables those whose
incomes are disrupted by trade and investment liberalization to be readily
compensated? Might the salience of the employment relation that appears
ethically to underwrite the ESOP's popularity carry-over to more attenuated,
even severed, employment relations? I think that it might, and to that
prospect I now turn.
105. It is in part or potential ethically exogenous in two senses, one trivial, the other less so.
First, one must use it responsibly in order to derive "utility" from it; it is a kind of
resource. Second and less trivially, the quantum of this resource that one has is at least in
part-and sometimes indeed in significant part-the product of fortune or fate rather
than effort. One can hold less than another simply by dint of having been born to the
wrong parents, so to speak. Seegeneraly Hockett, Whose Ownership?, suqpra note 1, at 31-51.
106. "Superficially" in light of what we saw stpra, Part II.B.
107. That is to say that it is viewed as an "employee benefit," as something predicated upon
lengthy labor-patronage for-a kind of "loyalty to"--the firm. More on this infra, Part HI
and Part IV.
108. Vee Hockett, Harniltonian Means, suepra note 1, at 98-120, 143-53.
109. Id. at 135-37.
110. Id. at 98-120, 143-53.
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III. MORE SOPS FOR MORE CITIZENS: ADAPTING THE STRUCTURE
TO ADDITIONAL PATRONAGE FORMS
Let us begin by reminding ourselves that labor with a firm-the
employment relation is an apparently ethically salient patronage relation.'
It is, first, an ongoing mode of relation between persons and firms." 2 And it
is, moreover, a mode of relation that seems to afford sanction to the conferral
of benefits upon benefiting persons. 13  It renders the latter apparently
111. So far as I have been able to determine, the only scholar who has devoted much
discussion to the relations between patronage and firm ownership is Hansmann. See
HANSMANN, sepra note 15, passim. I use the concept of patronage somewhat more
elasticly than Hansmann's, however-as is perhaps intimated by my addition of the
qualifier "ethically salient." My understanding of the term will accordingly be bit different
as well. I do not believe, however, that my understanding and employment of the term
will be incompatible with Hansmann's. More on this infra notes 112 and 113.
112. Hansmann appears to be less explicitly concerned with the "ongoingness" of patronage
relations, while being more explicitly concerned with a particular species of relating to the
firm-namely, selling to or purchasing from it. See infra note 113. 1 think our distinct
concerns with patronage nonetheless are compatible. For, first, my concern with the
possible ethical salience of patronage naturally lends itself to an emphasis upon longer-term
relations, at least among those who purchase from or contribute to firms in small
increments per transaction. (Duration of relating substitutes for magnitude of individual
transaction.) And, second, I think patronage relations as potentially involving more than
purchasing and selling alone to be implicit in Hansmann's own understanding of the term,
as evidenced by Hansmann's occasional recourse to the broader relational concept of
"supplying," which figures prominently in his treatment of stock-holders as financial
capital suppliers. Sepra note 15 at 12.
113. Hansmann defines "patrons" as "persons who transact with a firm either as purchasers of
the firn's products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor, or other factors of
production." Id. Much of the thrust of Hansmann's often astonishingly insightful
monograph is devoted to showing both (a) that it is typically a particular class of patrons
which owns most of the firms operating within a particular industry, and (b) why it is that
the particular classes which tend to own in particular industries end up being the more
efficient owners. My interest, though not incompatible with Hansmann's interest, is
nonetheless distinct; and the distinction accounts for my somewhat broadened
understanding and employment of the concept of patronage. My concern is with
patronage as a form of ongoing relation between persons and firms such as can be viewed
in part as the patron's consistent conferral of some manner of benefit upon the firm, such
as in turn can engage our willingness to view the patron's coming to own a share of the
firm as ethically unobjectionable-as something better than the product of a mere
"handout." That is to say that my angle on patronage here is as a "desert basis" in the
sense described infra note 170. This basis for interest in patronage places me in any way at
odds with Hansmann's efficiency-grounded basis for interest in the same. I do not
suggest that firms should be owned by patrons of a different kind than those that he
shows to be the more efficient owners of firms in particular industries. Rather, I simply
propose that more patrons within the class be added to the rosters of owners. The
remainder of this Part, I believe, will both make this plain and unpack more fully the ways
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earning or deserving of the benefits bestowed upon labor through leveraged
ESOP financing." 4
Yet labor is also but one way in which people relate themselves ongoingly
to firms in such manner as might activate ethical concern. This raises an
intriguing prospect. Perhaps we might rely upon patronage relations
additional to, or that vary upon, the employment relation in order to warrant
the public facilitation of share-spreading-in particular, to those we have
called "Peters," or "Twos" and "Threes" above. This Part proposes and
assesses a few possibilities, meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.
The idea is to approach the particular plan I wish to propose below, in Part
IV, by a brief sequence of suggestive steps.
A. A First, Simple Variant: Customer Stock Ownership Plans
One conspicuous form of patronage in some respects reminiscent of
labor is ongoing customership." 5 Some firms from which we purchase goods
and services are firms from which we regulary purchase them. In some cases
that consistency is attributable to something like customer loyalty-an
investment of trust, rather than labor, in the firm. In other cases the "loyalty"
is perhaps not what we should call voluntary, but reflects a lack of available
alternatives-our being held hostage, so to speak. There are of course
middling cases between the extremes-unthinking habit or ignorance of
alternative supply sources, for example. In all such cases, however, we can
plausibly imagine the relation to be sufficiently salient, from an ethical point
of view, as to warrant at least some degree of public facilitation of patrons'
gradually coming to own parts of the firms that they regularly patronize. 116
in which patronage relations might be seen ethically to underwrite benefit-conferrals upon
current non-owners within patronage classes.
114. Please see the discussion in Part II.C, supra, which suggests reasons why we publicly favor
ESOPs.
115. Indeed, in some industries customers constitute the most efficient class of firm-owners.
Examples are the farm supply industry, in which consumer cooperatives constitute an oft-
encountered firm form; rural electricity, in which customer cooperatives again figure
prominently; clubs that afford their members high-status "associative goods," which again
tend to be owned by their members; and urban housing, in which housing cooperatives
figure prominently. Seegeneral/y l-I-NSMANN, supra note 15, at 147-223.
116. Again, sometimes this happens quite "naturally," for reasons that appear to be rooted in
the comparative efficiencies of governance and contracting. See infra note 1133. But the
reasons for interest in an "ownership society" warrant our considering the fostering of
ownership even where it does not quite "naturally" arise, which of course seems to be
what has occurred in the case of ESOP proliferation. See stora, Part 1H. Those same
reasons presumably afford at least a preliminary answer to prospective objections rooted
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That is particularly so if we think the idea of widespread firm-owning a good
one on policy grounds.
Consider, then, this homespun example. There might be a small
university town centrally located, hence perhaps geographically isolated, in a
large U.S. state.1 7 People who live and work in the town see a lot of each
other, and come to feel a strong sense of community in consequence. They
feel this not only in relation to one another, but even in relation to the
relatively small number of retail establishments that sell to the townspeople.
Buyers and sellers are all thrown together here, even feel "centrally isolated"
together, perhaps even missing this feeling a bit when they are away.
Now a remarkable new grocery store comes to this town." 8 Everyone
talks about the new store, even showing it off to visitors and prospective new
residents. They are as proud as they are pleased, that at long last this store
has arrived." 9 Nearly everyone living or working within several miles of the
town now purchases groceries there, leave and pick up their dry cleaning
there, do their banking there, even leave their children to be attended there
while transacting. Things might develop and go on in this way for years.
That is an ongoing, many-faceted relation.
Now suppose that we find the recently floated American idea of an
"ownership society" to be an attractive one, for any number of reasons, 120
and so think that it might make for good public policy to encourage wider
ownership of firms. In that circumstance, might we not find it politically
acceptable, indeed attractive, to work to encourage the voluntary spread of
in the same normative source as are familiar objections to disgorgement remedies in
contract owing to their inefficiently coupling purchases from with investments in firms.
See Hockett, sources cited spra note 1. And thank you to Daniel Markovits for pressing
me here.
117. I am thinking of Ithaca, New York, where I live. But there are countless similarly situated
locales, not all of them university towns and not all of them as relatively isolated as Ithaca.
Indeed this example might also be plausibly applied, say, to a community-like
neighborhood or sector of a large city, such as is commonly found in New York, Chicago,
and Los Angeles. Please also bear in mind that the example following this one will make
no reference to community-like towns at all. All examples in this Article are meant to be
illustrative and suggestive, even to spur additional visualizations; they do not purport to
be exclusive or exhaustive.
118. I am alluding to Wegman's in Ithaca, New York, a store about which many indeed speak
with pride. This firm is not publicly traded, so I am asking that the reader pretend that it
is.
119. It is one of those towns that has had difficulty attracting and keeping nationally and even
regionally known merchant establishments.
120. 1 consider the variety of grounds upon, and the three principal American political
traditions to which, the notion of an "ownership society" might be attractive in Hockett,
Whose Ownership?, spra note 1, at 5-78.
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shares in this store or its holding company among the regular customers who
live in community with and partly organize their lives around it, just as we do
in the case of employees? Sure we might.121
Now consider a cognate example, applicable perhaps to larger
metropolitan areas or wider regions now in addition to smaller communities.
There might be a product or service the supply of which enjoys increasing
returns to scale. It is a "natural monopoly." 22 Perhaps it is a transport
system, an electrical power grid or high-speed internet network-a public or
publicly regulated utility. Customers of the firms that supply such products
and services, whether identified by reference to towns, cities or larger regions
serviced by these firms, might often find themselves "stuck" with their
suppliers. They have little choice but to patronize them. That is a large part
of why we regulate them. But might the same rationale not then warrant our
facilitating the customers' gradually coming to own them in part? Surely a
customers' status as a hostage is at least as ethically salient a patronage-form as
is the more voluntary conferral of customer loyalty, is not it?
Were we to endorse this line of thinking, then we might decide it
worthwhile to consider facilitating the acquisition of shares in the firms-the
grocery store or the utility -by their patrons in much the same way that we
facilitate share-acquisition in firms by employees. We might tax-break-assist
firms in debt-financing themselves, in exchange for their issuing shares to
trusts whose beneficiaries gradually came legally to own what initially they
would benefdall own. (Again, perhaps, as in the labor case, in proportion to
their patronage-for example, amounts purchased from the firms in place of
wages earned working for firms.) In essence, then, we would just replicate
121. It is of course not the case that facilitating ownership of local businesses will afford
optimal diversification. After all, personal incomes and the incomes of town-sharing or
region-sharing firms can to some extent co-vary- in the case, for example, of local or
regional slumps. But I ask that the reader bear with me a bit longer. As examples
proliferate below we shall see that diversification grows. Moreover, our aim here is to
make use of patronage relations as ethically salient grounds for public action facilitating
ownership, pursuant both (a) to the hypothesis posited sipra, Part IC, concerning why
the public is willing to subsidize ESOP expansion, and (b) to the further elaboration of
that hypothesis in this Article's predecessor pieces, concerning why we have acted
similarly to promote home-owning and higher education spreading in the way that we
have done. Finally, please note that I have already addressed the project of democratizing
income-risk-sharing across localities and even across nations in a separate article. See
Hockett, Aacro-Hedging, supra note 1, at 212-56. My hope is that all of these pieces
together afford at least a rough template for how best to render our society more
"owning," more risk-spread-efficient and more just.
122. In a way, of course, so was the store in the previous example. Small towns support less
competition among smallish suppliers than do cities.
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the financial structure of the leveraged ESOP arrangement.
particular patronage relation would change. We might call it
Stock Ownership Plan ("CuSOP"). 123 Imagine it thus:









Of course some things even apart from the differing patronage relation
that ethically grounds it would be different here relative to the ESOP as
presently constituted. There is no, say, federal customer benefit plans
("CRISA") for example, in the way that there is an ERISA structure upon
which ESOP programs partly are built. Nor, accordingly, does the revenue
code currently include any provisions that might encourage firm-financing
through CuSOPs as it does in the case of ESOPs. But that is all beside the
point. The point is that all of the means by which we currently facilitate
123. This SOP is not to be confused with a "consumer stock ownership plan" proposed by
Kelso, the latter appears to be little more than a producer cooperative. See KELSo &
KELso, sispra note 70, at 67-73.
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stock-acquisition by employees could be legislatively replicated to facilitate
stock-acquisition by long-term customers-loyal customers, hostage
customers, or "in-between" customers. And the public benefit that such
legislation would effectively confer-like that which public facilitation of
ESOPs confers-would be warranted, could be advocated, and might well be
politically embraced, on much the same grounds, the grounds of ethically
salient patronage.
B. A Second, Closer Variant: Rent-Recouping Stock Ownership Plans
Let us try another one, one that draws us yet closer to the plan that I wish
to propose for those "Twos" and "Threes" disproportionately harmed by
global trade and investment liberalization. Sometimes new resources are
discovered. Petroleum reserves are found in Alaska, newly exploitable
minerals are found in beds of magnesium nodules just off of the coast, some
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum becomes usable in a way that it was
not before, and so forth. Sometimes no living person or group of persons is
creditable with the discovery, or with the discovery's full exploitability. But
some such person or persons often can be partly so credited. The "Western"
and, especially, "American" way of doing things in any event is to permit
private agents-generally firms-to exploit the new possibilities-to
appropriate rents from them.1 24 So we want some of the value of the new
resources-what economists call "rents"-to flow very quickly into private
hands, even while not allof that value seems to be deserved by those parties.
What should we do with the surplus? We might "windfall profits" tax it,
but that might resemble a kind of incremental taking, 125 and the takings go to
the government. Westerners, and especially Americans, do not seem to like
that kind of thing any more.126 At any rate they have not of late found it as
palatable as they once did, perhaps because they are less trusting of the users
124. The appropriable rents justification for property rights appears to originate, at least in its
now canonical formulation, with Harold Demsetz, Toward a TheoO , of Propery Ri'ghts, 57
AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967).
125. Legally speaking this claim, associated with Richard Epstein, is of course hyperbolic. But
one can readily grasp the intuition that underwrites it. For the hyperbole, see, for
example. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOIAIN (1985).
126. See Id. for a representative screed. See also MICHAELJ. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH
BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INtHERITED WEALTH (2005) (detailing a
morbidly fascinating, documentary account of the exploitation of citizen cognitive error
by champions of the tax-evading well-to-do).
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of the takings-"the government"-than they once were.127 But Americans
in particular seem still to like ownership-they like that very much, in fact-
and they are aware that by definition nobody has earned a windfall. So why
not widen the distribution of shares in the firms that are authorized to exploit
the new opportunities?
So far, so good. This still leaves open, however, the question of
patronage. To whom should the shares be distributed? Is there some
perceivably "natural" class of patrons whose beneficiary status would be as
readily warranted as that of employees and long-term customers? After all,
we would presumably not wish simply to replace one class of windfall
beneficiaries with another, at random. How, then, to think about this? I
think we might employ a sort of "sliding scale" here. This might indeed be a
nice way gradually to generalize the original ESOP idea all the way out, so to
speak-that is, to move incrementally in the direction of broad global
recognition that good citizenship and faultless wage or salary loss themselves
constitute an ethically salient kind of patronage. 128
Let us think along those lines for a moment. Some new resources might
be broadly perceived as bearing a special nexus to the places where they are
found. Such places, in turn, might be perceived as being somehow ethically
"closer" or legally "more proximate" to-"more owned by," so to speak-
their residents than by non-residents. 129 So, for example, new oil found in
Alaska might be perceived as being somehow more saliently Alaskan even
than American. Alaskan citizens might accordingly be thought to stand in a
somewhat-even if but incrementally-closer patronage relation to any firm
granted rights to exploit new Alaskan oil reserves than are non-Alaskan
127. I employ scare-quotes here because I am simply conveying, rather than participating in,
that attitude pursuant to which some view the government as an alien force rather than an
agent of collective action. Perhaps the current iteration of this line of hostile thinking all
began with the disillusionments of the 1960s, which seem to have fed directly into the
populist "tax revolts" of the 1970s, out of which so much of current rightward-leaning
ideology seems to have grown.
128. This suggestion is taken up ifra, Part V.
129. Scare-quotes again indicate that I am attempting to give expression to a pre-reflective
manner of perception. I should note here that I am exceedingly uncomfortable with this
particular perception, and experience resort to it to be a compromise with territorialist
psychological dispositions that are regrettable at best. But bear with me for a moment.
Some such primitive intuition as this seems to underwrite the judgment that coal found
between Canada and Mexico is "American" coal, rather than North American coal or "the
coal of mankind," for example. Ideally I would prefer to repudiate the intuition, but if we
are stuck with it then we may as well harness it for a good purpose.
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Americans. 130 Alaska itself is constitutionally permitted, after all, to tax firms
that extract Alaskan oil reserves, even after the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") has done so. So it must be the case that we tend to view the citizens
of political units as being somehow more privileged than non-citizens in
respect of the benefits brought by the resources that are found and exploited
within the geographic boundaries of those units. Cognate observations to
these "Alaskan" observations might hold true in respect of magnesium
nodules found off the coast of Washington, Oregon and California. And
international law of course treats things much in this way on a nation by
nation basis.13'
Now bring these patronage considerations together with the earlier
rehearsed "windfall" considerations. Would it be too far a stretch to require,
as a condition for granting the rights to exploit the new resource to the firm,
that the firm distribute shares in itself to the residents of any municipality or
state with which the new resource is widely perceived to be especially closely
associated? For example, residents of any municipality or state that currently
might tax the enterprise that exploits the resources? Note that if the answer is
"no; it would not be a stretch," then we might not have to bother with tax or
other incentives at all. Or how about the following: we combine tax and other
incentives with the "carrot" that is the prospective new resource exploitation
itself, in a manner that enables us to lessen the former relative to what they
were in the ESOP and CuSOP cases. We thereby less expensively (to the
public fisc) encourage both (a) the entry of firms to do the exploiting, and (b)
130. In 1978 and 1980, voters' initiatives were introduced to establish the Alaska General Stock
Ownership Corporation ("AGSOC"), which would have provided Alaskan citizens
ownership interests in the Alaska Oil Pipeline. Pursuant to a tentative agreement with the
British Petroleum Company, the latter was to sell its interest in the Alaska Pipeline to
AGSOC. AGSOC would have enjoyed the backing of state credit to borrow. Under
federal matching legislation-specifically, Subchapter U of Chapter 1 under Subtitle A of
the Internal Revenue Code-AGSOC would also have enjoyed favorable federal income
tax treatment. See Title VI, Revenue Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2885 (1978). The AGSOC plan
also would have prohibited any one individual from taking ownership of more than ten
shares, in order to prevent concentrated ownership. See Alaska, Inc., an Economic
Experiment; Senator's Plan Would Distribute State's New Wealth to Cifizens; Alaska Inc., an
Experiment in Distibuting New Wealth, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1978, Sunday, Final Edition.
The Alaskan ballot measure nevertheless lost on a close popular vote (approximately
78,000 to 72,000). See, for example, the Alaskan state government website, available at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/initbal.htm, and the National Institute of
Democracy website, available at http://www.ni4d.us/people/gravel2.htm.
Notwithstanding the failure of the ballot initiative, Alaska did adopt a cognate program.
See infra, note 133.
131. See Hockett, Limits of Their World, supra note 1.
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As you might suspect already, this is the same diagram as Figures 1 and
2, with state or local citizens standing in as patrons now instead of employees
or customers. (So now the degree of patronage might track years of
132. This is not to be confused with Kelso's proposed "RECOPs," "GSOPs" or
"COMCOPs," which, though apparently geared toward spreading ownership of some
firms cognate with those under consideration here, are both (a) argued for on entirely
different-indeed, puzzling grounds, and more importantly (b) presumably for that
reason, structured differently from a financial standpoint. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note
70, at 75-83, 88-92, 99-103. For a more general charitable interpretation and correction
of Kelsonian "theories" and schemes, see Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, sApra note 1, at
124-42.
Structure of a RentSOP
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residence. 133) What is different, apart from the changed patronage basis here
ethically grounding the public benefit, is simply that the tax and other benefits
afforded by the public are less than before, since the exploitation rights are
themselves a benefit. (That is entailed by the "windfall" considerations.) The
loan made to the RentSOP trust might have to be issued by multiple financial
institutions as well, since in this case, unlike the ESOP and CuSOP, cases it
would be too large for any one lender to make.' 34 But all of that is, again, for
present purposes neither here nor there. The important point presently is
that the firm is still debt-financing itself on favorable terms in the interest of
boosting its capacity to exploit the newly exploitable resources, and spreading
ownership in itself-hence the benefits that accrue to its owners by dint of its
access to the resources-in the process.
Now note, in connection with our hope of maximizing both the number
of possible beneficiaries and the number of firms that beneficiaries might
gradually come partly to own, that we can readily broaden our understanding of
"local resource." Matters here, that is to say, are as they were in connection
with CuSOPs in Part III.A-candidates for RentSOPs can be proliferated.
We might broaden our understanding of "local resource" along at least
two axes. For one thing, we can move outward from locality to region to
nation or economic class. For another thing, we can plausibly broaden our
understanding of "resource" itself. For it is not always a matter of found
objects or substances, after all. A highly desired set of geographic coordinates
might count as well-say, a "prime location" upon which some highly
remunerative piece of commercial real estate stands. That is a paradigmatic
133. I ignore, for present purposes, the matter of crafting terms so as to avoid conflict with
court decisions overturning interstate-travel-burdening state laws, decided under the
Commerce Clause of Article I of, the Privileges and Immunities or Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to, or some "penumbral emanation" from those
or other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. In Zobel v. Williams, the Supreme Court
rejected Alaska legislation that awarded pipeline dividends to state residents based on the
duration of their residence up to the point at which distributions began. 457 U.S. 55, 64
(1982). But allowing the number of shares distributed thenceforth to grow with years of
residence would not seem to be constitutionally offensive so long as one could begin to
accumulate shares immediately upon taking up residence. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
134. Not just as a matter of capacity, but as a matter of law as well; the Bank Code's lending
limits could kick-in. See 12 U.S.C.S. § 84 (a)(1) (Lexis 2008) (requiring total outstanding
non-fully secured loans and credit extended by a national banking association to an
individual, including a trust, not exceed fifteen percent of that banking association's
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus); see also 12 U.S.C.S. § 84(a)(2) (Lexis 2008)
(requiting additionally that total outstanding fully secured loans and credit extensions
made by a national banking association not exceed ten percent of the association's
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus).
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case, in fact, of "rent." And renfiers who hold exclusionary rights to highly
desired spaces are rather like the "natural monopolists" considered in
connection with CuSOPs above at Part III.A. That is why the so-called
"classical" economists, pioneers like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were so
suspicious of them. 135 But we need not be suspicious. We can facilitate the
spaces' voluntary sale and purchase at fair market value instead, by broad
classes of locals, simply by treating the spaces like oil reserves or magnesium
nodules, and the firms that operate them like resource-extractors, in Figure 3
just above. 136  "Don't get mad," we might say, "get owning-get the
company."137
Turning from the resource dimension to the locality dimension, if we
move outward from seemingly "local" resources to more diffuse such
resources-for example, new portions of the electromagnetic spectrum-we
can move outward along the patronage dimension as well. We will thereby
draw-in more beneficiaries, more potential owner-beneficiaries of the firm's
privileged access. So we might imagine, say, that the U.S.
135. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO TIE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 161-63 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (describing rent as a monopoly price, not
consequent on any expense laid out by the renlie,; DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33-45 (Dent & Sons ed., 1987) (describing rentiers as
windfall beneficiaries of scarcity).
136. Hansmann suggests a number of reasons for the absence of urban utility cooperatives
analogous to rural electrical cooperativess, among them the comparative transience of
urban dwellers relative to rural dwellers and conflicts of interest among disparate classes
of prospective urban owners. See HANSMANN, siora note 15, at 173-79. While such
phenomena presumably account in part for the absence of spontaneously generated urban
utility cooperatives, they do not, so far as I can see, stand in the way of publicly facilitated
partial ownership of cotporate utilities by their customers. Moreover, to whatever degree
we might worry that partial ownership by customers is "not enough," we can readily
mitigate the worry by means familiar to other, existing utilities-ownership scenarios.
Hence, rates can be regulated with a view to preventing price-discrimination as among
classes of user; and any worry over the development of, say, "absentee ownership" in the
long run would seem to be mitigated or mitigable by (a) the fact that highly transient
residents of a municipality likely will not come to acquire much in the way of shares in any
event, (b) the possibility of recourse to required redemption-indeed, we might even
arrange to have transients trade their erstwhile utilities' shares for shares in utilities located
in their new locales, with the utilities themselves in turn exchanging the shares, or at worst
(c) the possibility of recourse to mere beneficial ownership by the new owners, legal
ownership to remain with consumer trusts established for the purpose of retained legal
ownership. Indeed, as Hansmann himself points out some municipal utilities can readily
be lkened to cooperatives, organized, as they are, quite similarly. Id. at 178.
137. A variation, perhaps, on the 1979 Remington electric razor advertisement, in which Victor
Kiam averred, "I liked it so much, 1 bought the company." I Liked the Slogan So Much
BBC NEWS, May 30, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/357091.stm.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996138 is amended to work somewhat differently
than it actually has done. That is, Congress might not have authorized the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") simply to grant existing
broadcast companies new "advanced spectrum," without requiring payment
therefor. 139 Instead it might have established a sort of "national RentSOP"
on behalf of all citizens, and then offered the combined inducement of
occupancy over the HD bandwidths and some (diminished) tax incentives to
get the firms to spread shares in themselves to the citizenry. That would not
only be a readily intuited extension from the more "locally located" RentSOP
idea; it would also amount to a convenient bridge to a yet more universal SOP
still.
IV. AN SOP FOR PETER: GLOBAL STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
All right, let us now turn to those whose plight occasions our concern in
this Article, Part I's "Twos" and, especially, "Threes"-those whom we also
called "Peters." Might we not view their heightened labor income risk as a
particularly poignant variation on the employment relation itself which
ethically underwrites the ESOP, as discussed in Part 11? And might we not
also view the income gains realized by "Ones" through globalization as a
species of rent as discussed in Part III? I think that we might.
For observe that we are supposing, per the hypothesis, that Peter truly is
"faultlessly" disemployed in consequence of global trade and investment
liberalization-because more desperate Paul can work for less. We are also
supposing that Peter is aging, hence truly unable to "retool" himself
sufficiently so as to recover all of his lost income through new forms of
employment. When these suppositions are borne out, Peter bears a
particularly poignant, and indeed ethically salient, relation to his erstwhile
138. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. For commentary, see PETER W. HUBER et al, THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1996) and 74 AM. JUR. 2d Telecommunications
16.
139. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000) ("iTihe Commission ... should limit the initial eligibility for
such licenses [for use of advanced spectrum] to persons that (1) are licensed to operate a
television broadcast station or hold a permit to construct such a station ... and (2) shall
adopt regulations that allow the holders of such icenses to offer such ancillary
, 
or
supplementary services on designated frequencies as may be consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity."). For a discussion of the Federal Communication
Commission's ("FCC") grant, under the Act, of a free spectrum for HDTV, see Matthew
Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker's Road Not Taken: The Political Economy of Broadcasing in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 353, 365-67 (1996).
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employer. 140 The "Marys" who own the employing firm, have shed him
precisely in order to capture the surplus that is generated by paying less in the
form of wages and regulatory compliance to the more desperate "Pauls."
Peter's labor patronage in this case has effectively been replaced with a sort of
"shadow," or "ghost" labor patronage. His erstwhile relation is extinguished,
and Peter is accordingly harmed owing to no fault of his own.
Now note that Mary, for her part, is no more ethically creditable than
Peter is blameworthy. For again, by hypothesis, Mary has simply inherited a
goodly portion of the firm shares that she owns, or of the wealth she would
have expended to purchase them. And the capital gains that now will accrue
to those shares in consequence of global trade and investment liberalization
are no more the result of her value-adding effort than were those that accrued
to her by dint of her being born into wealth. They are the consequence of
changes in the global legal environment, with which most Marys had nothing
whatever to do. From Mary's perspective, therefore, they are windfalls. They
are rents flowing her way, by virtue of no more than her exclusive possession
of what was given to her at birth. Ethically, they are on all fours with mineral
deposits or petroleum reserves discovered beneath her inherited real estate
holdings.
Now, if these considerations are in order, then do not our core values-
our opportunity-egalitarian sense of justice as elaborated above at Part I and
Part II.C-suggest that we view Mary as properly bound to share some of her
globalization-wrought, windfall gains with Peter? And would not Mary, in
turn, as well as the rest of us, per our endowment dispositions discussed in
Part II.C view the most readily palatable means offailitaling that gain-sharing
as that involving the issuance of new shares, by the globalization-benefiting
and Peter-disemploying firms, to Peter? Of course, that will dilute the value
of Mary's shares in the firm. But this is simply another way of saying that it
will amount to Mary's sharing her globalization-wrought gains with those
Peters whom her globalization-benefiting firms have laid off. And as we
noted above at Part II.C, sharing of this sort is much less likely to be
experienced as "taking" and "redistributing" than are "taxing and spending."
How, then, would a SOP configured in conformity to these observations
be structured? Well, in light of the sample SOP-variants laid out in Part III, I
will wager it is easy to visualize now. I will sketch two renditions of it, one
narrowly tailored, the other a bit more ambitious.
140. 1 discuss such "retooling" costs, along with other determinants of Peter's faultlessness, at
length in Hockett, Global Mao-Hedging sipra note 1.
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A. Compensating Lost Labor Patronage: Outsource Stock Ownership
Plans
Think of the first, most narrowly tailored rendition simply as a
straightforward variation on the RentSOP itself described just above. Treat
new access to global intermediate product, capital and labor markets as the
"resource." Treat those who are disemployed by firms accessing those newly
opened markets as the natural constituents-analogues to the "citizens of
Alaska" countenanced above in Part III.B. We can presumably employ the
same means for determining that Peter was indeed disemployed owing to
trade liberalization, and thus an appropriate beneficiary, that we employ
currently in determining whether employees hard hit by trade liberalization
are entitled to "adjustment relief."141
Let years of employment with such firms serve as degrees of patronage-
an ethical-intuitively attractive suggestion from "two angles," as it were, in
this case. For not only is it the case that more years laboring for the laying-
off firm render the patronage relation appreciably "thicker" or "deeper"-
something akin to the "loyalty" that we interpreted as ethically salient
patronage in connection with CuSOPs in Part III.A. It is also the case that
more years' labor with the laying-off firm mean less time for Peter to "retool"
and find new employment.
All right, so far so good, I take it. But now here is something that
perhaps I have not unobjectionably left out. It is not the case that Peter is
disemployed only to the benefit of compatriot Marys owning compatriot
firms, is it? After all, Peter's firm might not simply "outsource" Peter's labor.
It might go out of business, being out-competed by foreign firms. Those
firms are held largely by foreign Marys, of course-indeed, in some cases
even foreign governments.1 42 Moreover, since global investment has been
liberalized at least as surely as-indeed, even more surely than-trade,143 even
domestic Mary for her part is likely unharmed. That is if well advised by
investment consultants, she has long since dumped shares in Peter's employer
for shares in other firms altogether-both domestic and, increasingly,
foreign.144
141. See Trade Adjustment Assistance Act and rules promulgated thereunder, available at
http://www.doleta.gov.
142. China, for example, and other governments that control domestic enterprises by
maintaining majority stakes there in.
143. See Hockett, Mission Creep, snpra note 1.
144. Id.
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But if all of this is so, then it presumably will not suffice, if our goal is to
ensure that the Marys share gains quite generally with Peters, simply to spread
new shares in disemploying firms to their erstwhile, now laid off employees.
To plug all the leaks, so to speak, as well as to diversify holdings by Peters
more generally and thus render their capital incomes more secure, we shall
want to link Peters to Marys via more firms than one. How to do that?
I think that there are a number of options here, none of which need be
the one. I will accordingly resist the temptation to try to blueprint in detail
every such possible means, and instead shall sketch simply what 1 think is a
suggestive and promising multi-step general strategy. First, then, because the
patronage link between Peters and healthy, continuing domestic firms that
"outsource" their labor is particularly ethically salient and heuristically
compelling, I will begin with those. We will set things up, that is to say, again
rather as we did in the RentSOP case above in Part ILI.B, now calling it
something like, say, an "OutsourceSOP":










I Tiely Repayment I
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Once again, of course, we find the same basic structure here as is found
in Figures 1, 2 and 3 above, with disemployed laborers rather than ongoing
employees, customers or "Alaskans" now standing in as our salient class of
patrons. The degree of patronage, however, will again track years of
employment just as in the ESOP-which seems intuitively attractive both
because the outsourced employee has invested more of his working life and
"specific human capital" into the firm and, conversely, because he has got less
to give now to other prospective employers. Other than this and the changed
patronage basis here ethically grounding the public benefit, the only new
wrinkle is simply that the benefits afforded to outsourcing firms by the
public-in the form, inter alia, of negotiated trade and investment
liberalization agreements-are conditioned upon share-spreading by the firms
to the laborers they lay off. The important point for present purposes is that,
just as in the other SOP examples, the firm in this case still finds itself debt-
financing on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity to exploit
the newly exploitable resource that is a newly opened set of global markets,
and spreading ownership in itself-hence the benefits that accrue to its
owners by dint of its access to those markets-in the process.
But now, how about the foreign firms? Will not they be more difficult to
rope-in to the scheme than domestic firms? Well, here things become a little
more complicated, but not all that much once we think about it. Indeed the
principal "complication" is simply that there are multiple means of doing justice
to Peter. One means would be simply to tax Marys with large holdings in
foreign firms, the proceeds to be used to purchase shares in the same foreign
firms, to be placed into SOP-styled "Peter accounts." A cognate and perhaps
more attractive (because non-taxing) means-though this would work more
effectively in respect of primary issuances than of purchases on the secondary
market-would be to condition investment liberalization (the continued
absence of capital controls) upon foreign firms' issuing a certain amount of
new stock to such "Peter accounts" per increment of stock acquired by
compatriot Marys.
Of course, foreign firms might be expected to protest that investment in
themselves by Marys and would be rendered less attractive in consequence of
the taxing method, and thus would be illicitly disadvantaged relative to
domestic investment. But if we were to develop means of ensuring that it
was only indeed "Marys" whom we were thus taxing-for example, by taxing
capital gains realized on foreign stock holdings only beyond some
threshold-this would simply amount to the unethical demand that Marys be
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permitted unjustly to benefit at the expense of innocent Peters. Moreover,
investments by Marys in firms that abide by labor, environmental and other
standards equivalent to those observed by domestic firms could be
exempted. 145
That of course raises the other, cognate prospect I just mentioned,
amounting to yet another means by which to improve the relative justice-
standings of Mary and Peter. Why not condition trade and investment
liberalization themselves upon all benefiting firms' financing themselves at
least in part through the SOP structure to enable all Peters to share in the
gains realized by Marys? That is to say, why not "go national" or indeed
"global" with the full "OutsourceSOP" program itself? That will take us to a
second rendition I have in mind here.
B. Going Global: "Global Citizen" Stock Ownership Plans
Let us pursue that last line of thought for a moment. While at it, let us
link it up with the earlier mentioned matter of Marys who disinvest from
globalization-damaged, Peter-disemploying firms in order to reinvest not
abroad, but in other domestic firms whose production processes Peter's long-
developed firm- or sector-specific human capital is not suited. Let us also
link it up to the yet larger matter of income security and its relation to
investment diversification more generally. Might we not develop either a
national or, more ambitiously, multinational compact pursuant to which all
"Peters" nationwide or worldwide benefit through something like the SOP
structure in return for their "playing by the rules" or perhaps affording some
other form of national or international service? This might ring a bit
grandiose at present, but please bear with me a moment.
Here, more precisely, is what I have in mind. It seems plausible to suggest
that citizenship itself is a kind of patronage, even if "thinner" than most other
forms. It is an ongoing relation such as can warrant, in some cases, the public
conferral of at least some kinds of benefit. At any rate "good citizenship"
would seem so, such that everyone who "plays by the rules," "works hard" or
perhaps provides some kind of ongoing public service, can be said to deserve
145. Note that this is not the same thing as conditioning trade liberalization upon trading
partners' subjecting their firms to the same labor, environmental and other regulatory
standards as those to which domestic firms are subjected. It is only to require that Marys
who exploit such differentials share the gains that they realize thereby with the Peters.
Lest you worry that the effect will nevertheless be the same, only differing in degree rather
than kind by dint of the Marys then turning to invest more in domestic firms that also do
not employ Peter, please read on. I aim next to close that loophole.
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some solicitude, perhaps even the guaranty of some "basic minimum," from
us all, would it not?
Surely we all as a group, in a sense, feel we owe a "hand up" to those
among us who share our core values, obey all our laws, seek useful
employment and are nonetheless "down" by the workings of fortune not
fault. That seems to be what our oft-invoked commitments to equal justice,
equal worth, and equal dignity commit us to, at the very least. And those
commitments all jointly add up, not to a guaranteed equality of citizens'
ultimate outcomes, of course, since outcomes impound efforts as well as
opportunities, but at least to equality of real opportunity as suggested above
in the Introduction, Part I, and Part II.C.146
I do not believe anyone will disagree with these truths-which not only
Americans seem to hold "self-evident.' 147 What we do sometimes disagree
about are the empirics of actual responsibility-the comparative degrees to
which chance and choice have determined particular citizens' outcomes. I
linger at some length upon practical means of disentangling these
intermingling "inputs" to citizens' "wealth functions" elsewhere. 48  For
present purposes, however, it will do simply to recall what we reminded
ourselves of above at Part II.C. That is (a) the more innocent a prospective
beneficiary of a share-spreading program, (b) the less well endowed that
beneficiary already is, and (c) the more readily viewed as an ethically
exogenous resource or material opportunity a spread item is, the easier it is to
perceive publicly augmented spreading as a redress of ill-fortune. The easier
in such case it is to view public action as vindicating equal opportunity rather
than simply doling out "hand-outs." And that is all the more so when public
augmentation takes the form of tax breaks. 149
In that light, it would seem that we might try a yet more generalized
variation on the ESOP, this one geared toward benefiting those in particular
who are young, lacking in resources, or good citizens who play by the rules.
We might begin by targeting those who benefit their country or the global
146. See, e.g., Hockett, sources cited supra note 1; see also spra Part I.C.
147. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 29-56. That is where I endeavor to locate
and overlapping consensus among our dominant political traditions-a consensus that
converges upon a shared ideal I label that of an "efficient equal-opportunity republic." See
also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra note 1, at 142-73; Robert Hockett, The Deep
Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theogy of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1179 (2005). The
"self-evidence" remark, of course, alludes to THOM1AS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the
Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776,
reprinted in THOMASJEFFERSON: WIRITINGS 19 (Martin E. Segal ed., 1984).
148. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, at 36-51.
149. See suora, Part III.C.
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polity through something akin to AmeriCorps services. We might indeed
think about instituting, perhaps through the United Nations, something like a
"WorldCorps."' 50  We can readily ensure that beneficiaries meet these
criteria--criteria which will reflect and in effect define the form of patronage
that we believe ethically to underwrite the benefit.151 And we can financially
structure the arrangement so as to ensure that beneficiaries benefit only by
working, rather as happens in the case of the ESOP.
Here is how. First, establish a national or multinational trust, a sort of
cross between various nations' national pension trusts and the humbler ESOP
trust schematized at Part II. We might call this trust something like, say, the
national or international "Citizen Stock Ownership Plan" or "CitSOP" Trust.
Second, open individual "citizen trusts" or "accounts" for every citizen-
perhaps upon each citizen's reaching adulthood (in the "accounts" case), or at
birth (in the "trusts" case) as has recently been begun in the United
Kingdom. 5 2 These individual CitSOP accounts could be administered rather
as was envisaged in connection with the "USA" accounts proposed in the late
1990s by President Clinton of the United States, or the Social Security
"personal accounts" proposed somewhat more recently, or even the accounts
proposed by the IMF's own co-designer, Lord Keynes, nearly seventy years
ago. 153
150. The first large-scale post-Homesteading era education-spreading in the United States-
hence, "human capital" spreading-programs began with veterans as beneficiaries. See
Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 1, at 144-46. How fitting it would be, to recognize
other forms of service in similar ways.
151. Note that we do this already with federal home finance and higher education assistance.
We employ both financial need criteria and criteria related to whether citizens are law-
abiding. See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 1, at 97.
152. I refer to Prime Minister Tony Blair's Child Trust Fund---or more popularly, "baby
bonds"-plan implemented in 2001. See Blair Banks on Babj Savings Scheme, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 27, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpoitics/1297324.stm. Former
Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska proposed something similar stateside in 2000 called
"KidSave Accounts." See Idea of the Week: Kidsave, NEW DEM DISPATCH,Oct. 13, 2000,
available at http://www.dlc.org/ndolci.cfm?contentid=2372&kald = 131&subid=207.
153. In 1999, President Clinton proposed "universal savings accounts," (USAs). See Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Remarks of the President on
Universal Savings Accounts (Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://cinton4nara.gov/
WH/New/html/19990414-3020.html; Pamela Perun, Urban Inst., Matching Private
Saving with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving (1999),
http://www.urban.org/publications/309272.html. A similar structure of private
accounts, now without government income support, figured into George W. Bush's 2005
"State of the Union" address. See George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2,
2005), available at http://wxww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ 2 0050202-
11 .html; Bush Pushes Private Accounts, CBS NEWS, May 4, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/05/04/politics/main692991.shtrml. For Keynes's visionary and, as it turned
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Now, let the national or multinational CitSOP Trust borrow from lending
institutions just as firms' ESOP trusts do, and let them use the proceeds of
the loans to purchase newly issued, dividend-yielding common stock from
firms. Grant participating firms and lending institutions, in turn, more or less
the same tax incentives as they are afforded in connection with U.S. ESOP
arrangements. Let the national or international CitSOP trusts, in turn, pledge
the purchased stock as collateral15 4 and steadily pay down the debts to the
lenders out of, say, the tax revenue brought in from participating firms. Let
the full set of arrangements, in short, look something like this:
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On Keynes's role in designing the Fund, see, for example, Hackett, Misson, Creep, supra
note 1.
154. Though of course this also might be deemed unnecessary in, for example, the United
States in view of the full faith and credit enjoyed by a federal institution. Indeed, even
was the trust to function as a government sponsored entity ("GSE"), it would in effect be
viewed as being fully eighty percent as credit-worthy as the federal government itself for
purposes of bank capital adequacy regulation. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2007).
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This looks familiar. It is Figure 1 (or 2 or 3 or 4) again, save again with
some differing persons and entities-apart from issuing firms and lenders-
involved, once more in light of the distinct form of patronage that we are
rewarding. The only complications found here but not there (in the ESOP,
CuSOP, RentSOP and OutsourceSOP cases) have to do with how precisely
we decide to define the salient patronage form. Hence, for example, on the
one hand, if we begin with national or multinational service of some sort as
the salient patronage form, then the amount of stock released over time to
the individual beneficiary's CitSOP account will track her hours or weeks or
years of service. If, on the other hand, law-abiding citizenship itself is the
patronage category, then stock amounts will rise simply with years of
citizenship-rather as one's U.S. Social Security or cognate national pension
benefit elsewhere (for example, Chile15 5) rises with time spent at work.
Of course, we might also stratify patronage subtypes in this case, such that
law-abiding citizenship alone entitles the beneficiary to some basic minimum
of stock released per quarter, national or international service of one sort
entitles her to some amount more, national or international service of another
sort entitles her to a yet larger increment more, and so on. Finally, insofar as
it is opportunity deficits that have activated our concern, we might-but also
might not-"needs test" one or more of the benefits here, perhaps applying a
graduated discount factor to entitled benefits as personal wealth rises. 5 6
Were we to do that, we might consider disemployment by an "outsourcing"
firm itself to constitute such a need, in effect growing the CitSOP directly out
of the OutsourceSOP. (In such case again we would presumably verify
eligibility by means similar to those employed presently in connection with
statutory "adjustment relief."' 1 )
There are of course many variations and gradations that we can consider
and experiment with in all of this, for again the aim here is to establish the
plausibility and attractiveness of the general idea rather than to lock us in to
one particular blueprint. The important points for present purposes, then, are
155. For a good sampling of the aims, ambitions and operations of various national pension
programs, see, for example, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Salvador Valdes-Prieto ed., 1997).
156. A limiting case, then, might be that of the offspring of wealthy families, who perhaps on
the one hand would not qualify for any benefit of this particular (CitSOP) sort. It might,
however, on the other hand be deemed preferable not to needs test at all, on more or less
the same political popularity grounds as the U.S. Social Security Income's ("SSI")
abstention from needs testing.
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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more fundamental in nature. The first is that the basic model can
perspicuously accommodate any form of patronage-any form of ethically
deserving status such as might politically sanction benefit conferral-that we
envisage. The second point is that it can do so while enabling us to confer
the benefit in a manner that both (a) spreads firm-ownership, and (b) does so
by means that respect both our core values and our endowment sensibilities as
rehearsed above in Part II.C.
The third point is that we can, though we need not, in one way or
another either wholly or partly condition trade and investment liberalization
upon participation by other nations in some such multilateral program as this,
which requires only already well-to-do Marys, not erstwhile penurious Pauls,
to share the surpluses that they glean in consequence of globalization with
recently and faultlessly "outsourced" Peters. (We can condition continued
globalization, that is to say, upon everyone's truly gaining.)
And finally the fourth point, to which I turn now in a bit more detail, is
that the national or international CitSOP idea fans naturally out into a broader
consideration that deserves a bit more play. I mean the fact that the Peters
who elicit our concern, possessing as they generally do only one,
comparatively undiversifiable form of capital- "human capital"-are
inherently subject to more income risk than are the Marys, whose firm-share-
holdings are readily diversified. Might we work, then, to render our
compensated Peter's new capital form as secure as is Mary's?
C. Addressing the Risks of Ownership: Portfolio-Diversifying SOP
Mutuals
One particular advantage enjoyed by the CitSOP idea that is not enjoyed
to the same degree by the CuSOP, RentSOP and single firm OutsourceSOP
ideas is the automaticity of the CitSOP's diversficalion of acquired stocks. If a
broad variety of firms nationally or transnationally were to participate in the
CitSOP program, beneficiaries could perforce receive shares in a broad array
of firms. In the earlier-rehearsed CuSOP, RentSOP and OutsourceSOP
cases, by contrast, diversification would ride upon more accidental factors-
namely, the number of different corporate firms that the particular beneficiary
regularly patronized as customer (voluntarily, involuntarily or in between), the
number of such rent-extracting firms in more or less close proximity to which
the beneficiary lived, or the number of firms-typically but one-for which
the beneficiary labored. How, then, in more detail might we design SOP-like
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or SOP-complementing arrangements that might optimally diversify holdings
among all SOP beneficiaries irrespective of SOP-type?
Once again a variety of methods might be employed. I will model two
very simple, exemplary cases here. The first model might be called that of the
"SOP Mutual." Various SOP trusts would convey their primary issuer stock
holdings to an intermediary, which in return would convey shares in itself of
equal value to the trusts.15 8 The intermediary (and now secondary issuer)
would be, in effect, a mutual fund whose (initial) members were SOP
trusts. 159 Subsequently the SOP trusts would, rather than gradually releasing
sponsoring issuers' securities to their beneficiaries' individual accounts over
time, release SOP Mutual shares instead. Shares of the latter sort also would
serve, where shares collateralize loans used for the purchase of primary issuer
stock, in place of the latter as collateral. Diagramatically, then, things would
look thus:
158. Fund shares would be valued as are any mutual fund's shares. Individual issuer shares
would be valued as are any issuer's-by "the market" in the case of publicly valued firms,
pursuant to the "cashflow" method in the case of closely held firms. See generally ToM
COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MtANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES
131-297 (3d ed. 2000). 1 ignore here the question of means of avoiding imprecisions
occasioned by market fluctuations, accounting indeterminacies, and so forth, as there
seem to be no difficulties specific to the present case and not already dealt with by
familiar means in other investment company contexts.
159. And, as we will see in a moment, SOP trust beneficiaries.
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It is worth noting here that the SOP Trusts participating in SOP Mutual
arrangements could be of all types-ESOPs, CuSOPs, RentSOPs,
OutsourceSOPs, even CitSOPs were there good reason. 160 And the more
SOP types and SOPs, of course, the greater the degree of diversity, hence the
lesser quantum of value at risk, that would be faced by our SOP
beneficiaries-our "Peters." We might then have here a bit of the "best of
both worlds," so to speak. We would be both fostering patronage relations
between persons and firms-since benefits ride upon such relations-and
dissipating the income-risk that attends patronage-concentration.
An advantage of the SOP Mutual model is that it enables SOP
beneficiaries-not to mention such lenders as whose loans are collateralized
by SOP Trust-held stocks-to reap the benefits of diversification even before
they become legal as distinguished from beneficial owners. If, however, we
found that we had or we wished to forgo that advantage for some reason, we
160. For example, where an insufficient variety of firm types participate in CitSOP
arrangements.
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could mutualize at the individual beneficiary level rather than at the SOP
Trust level. We might, for example, condition beneficiaries' qualifying for the
SOP benefit upon their agreement to diversify their holdings for some period
of time. Or we might differently tax gains upon individually owned primary
issues and secondary (mutual) stock. Or yet again, what seems more likely, a
gradually growing degree of financial understanding enjoyed by citizens
holding gradually growing portfolios of securities 161 presumably would of
itself prompt our SOP beneficiaries better to diversify their legally owned
holdings. We might even provide, facilitate or otherwise encourage the
provision of such counseling.
In all events, diagrammatically, things would look rather as they do in
Figure 6, save that now arrows would link, not SOP Trusts and SOP Mutuals,
but individual SOP beneficiaries and ordinary mutual funds:
161. We might even subsidize or require-the latter perhaps in the form of benefit
conditionality-some baseline degree of financial counseling, as we do in the case of our
federal home- and education-finance programs. See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note
1, at 112,151.
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Figure 7: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with
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And we might imagine, of course, ordinary mutual funds serving both in
their current capacities and as SOP Mutuals.
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Figure 8: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with SOP
















There seems no reason, then, why we might not achieve optimal
diversification among our growingly owning citizens even while rewarding
their multiple ongoing patronage relations with a perhaps somewhat lesser
variety of firms.
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V. A ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
Everything I have attempted to picture and think-through in Part IV
implicates the International Financial Institutions ("IFIs") and the "New
International Financial Architecture" that they have been busily constructing
since the mid-1940s. 162 A possible problem at this juncture, however, is that
it does not implicate them solely in one way. What role or roles the IFIs
should play-and indeed what roles which IFIs should play-will ride largely
on how we determine to structure and institute a system of OutsourceSOP
arrangements, CitSOP arrangements, or both. And I have repeatedly
abstained from committing to any one way of proceeding with these
arrangements, in view of the exploratory, "thought-experimenting" nature of
the present Article.
Perhaps the best way to think about the role of the IFIs in a manner that
coheres with our present purposes, then, is to divide the inquiry into two
stages. In the first stage I will discuss generally why and how the IFIs are
implicated. For what can be said here will both (a) be applicable to any
particular role or set of roles we envisage for the IFIs, and (b) delimit how we
can more specifically envisage those roles themselves. In the second stage,
then, I will sketch the role of the IFIs' a bit more specifically. But I will still
do so in broad enough outline as to remain appropriately open to the plurality
of options presented by the "thought experimenting" done in Part IV.
A. How They are Constitutionally Implicated
The proposals envisaged in Part IV are all, at their most basic, financial in
nature. They are also designed with a view to better apportioning the benefits
and burdens of globalization. The central idea is to spread what I have called
ethically exogenous benefits and burdens more equitably, in keeping with our
core opportunity-egalitarian values as laid out in Part I and Part II.C. The aim
is also to do so, in keeping with our methods-constraining endowment
dispositions as briefly rehearsed in Part II.C via the mechanisms through
which globalization-benefited business firms finance themselves. By
taxbreak-assisting corporate debt-finance in return for corporate share-
spreading-which of course is financial capital-spreading--or by conditioning
firms' receipt of rent-like benefits-such as those occasioned by
162. See Hockett, Macro to Micm to ''ission Creep," senpra note 1; see also Hockett, Global Macro-
Hedging, slnpra note 1.
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globalization-upon share-spreading, the SOP plans do something that is just
as financial as it is ethically and intuitively attractive. That is they harness
finance and globalization themselves to spread globalization's own financial
benefits more widely. And the benefits themselves, to repeat, are as financial
in nature as could be. They are corporate securities.
Now precisely for these reasons, the suggestions made in Part IV fall
squarely within what I have argued in a number of other venues to comprise
the emerging mandate of the principal IFIs-the Bretton Woods institutions
in particular. 163 What do I mean by "emerging mandate" here? I mean two
things, one fairly broad, and the other narrower in sweep. What I mean
broadly is that the IFIs' legally mandated and pragmatically necessary role is,
at its most generally characterized, to facilitate sustainable global economic
integration. More specifically, it is to do so from that integration process's
specifically financial nodes. 64 This is, of course, a complex and evolving
mandate, not least because global financial markets and practices are both
highly complex and now rapidly evolving.' 65
Now this mandate originally involved the IMF in overseeing and
maintaining the global currency regime upon which product market
integration depended. 166 It involved the World Bank in financing postwar
reconstruction and new infrastructure development, both directly and
indirectly. 167  Since the 1970s, 1980s and, especially, the later 1990s, the
mandate has steadily come to involve rather more for all of the IFIs. And
that has been largely in owing precisely to the IFIs'-and indeed
globalization's-successes in carrying out the mandates' earlier stages.
The Fund's comparatively recent domestic structural adjustment and
global financial market monitoring roles, for example, have been steadily
transforming it into a critical determinant of the legal and regulatory
infrastructures not only of cross-border financial transactions, but
unavoidably of domestic financial arrangements as well. 168 The World Bank,
for its part, has come increasingly-and again, it would seem, unavoidably-
to treat domestic pension and social insurance arrangements as critical
163. See articles cited in second paragraph of note 1.
164. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. "Indirectly" by effectively encouraging private lending. See id.; see also Hockett, Three
Pillars, supra note 1.
168. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1. See also Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra note 1.
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components of the infrastructures that must be developed in order for
economic development itself to continue steadily. 169
All of these developments were, at least in broad outline, both
foreseeable and indeed foreseen during the IFIs' founding era in the mid
1940s. And so they were legally provided for in the constitutive documents,
acts and shared understandings from which the institutions grew. 170 The
founders recognized, and in fact actively sought, the gradual integration of
world product and service markets. They did so in the interest of both
greater prosperity among, and closer integration between, national societies
themselves.' 7' They accordingly also saw need of a pragmatically adjustable
role for international collaboration in the realm of finance and its regulation.
That was so partly because financial services are themselves among the
services that trade. Yet more importantly, it was because finance, financial
markets and financial products are critically determinative of the operation,
integration and stably sustainable growth of markets more generally. 7 2
Now the prospects considered in Part IV just above, I believe, fall quite
squarely within this same province, both as a prudential and as an ethical
matter. Prudentially speaking, global trade and investment liberalization seem
to have entered more turbulent political waters in the last decade or so. The
process's perceived "losers" have been growing more numerous, more vocal,
or both. And it seems they are beginning to be heard and heeded-not just
by activists and agitators, but by leaders and legislators as well. Popular cable
television commentators are not far behind-indeed they seem well ahead
of-this curve.173 If the process of global economic integration is to continue
and we are to avoid backsliding into a 1930s-style retrenchment, then we will
do well to find means of making more stakeholders among those who are
currently growing both more disenfranchised and more disenchanted.
I have suggested over the course of Part II through Part IV that one
ethically attractive and intuitively satisfying means of making more
stakeholders would be the making of more shareholders-holders of shares
in the very firms that now benefit by globalization. This form of stake is of
169. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1. See also Hockett, Gestalt-Suitch, spra note 1;
Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
170. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1. See also Hockett, Gestalt-Snitch, supra note 1;
Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
171. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1. See also Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra note 1;
Hockett, Three Pillars, spra note 1. The perceived economic roots of the war were of
course very much before their minds.
172. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1. See also Hockett, Gestalt-Sn-itcb, supra note 1;
Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
173. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
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course financial itself, in that shares are financial assets par excellence. And
the means I am proposing for spreading these shares are financial as well. So
both in respect of ends-sustaining continued global market integration by
better spreading such integration's financial benefits-and in respect of
means-financial engineering means-what I suggest here looks clearly to
implicate the IFIs' developing mandates.
This is what I mean, then, "more broadly" in saying the IFIs are
implicated by what I am proposing. What do I mean more narrowly? I mean
that as I have noted elsewhere, the IFIs' proper roles in facilitating sustainable
global economic integration can be helpfully schematized as falling within any
of four quadrants formed by two axes.1 74 The first axis is that running
between what we can call "programs" and "policies." This divide is rooted in
the structures of the IFIs' enabling treaties themselves. It principally involves
the IFIs in developing "policies" to encourage and facilitate particular kinds
of member state "program.' 175
The second axis runs between "opportunity" and "risk." These amount
to the financial faces, respectively, of globalization's aforementioned
"benefits" and "burdens." 176 This axis is rooted, not in the IFI's enabling
treaties, but simply in the functional roles played by finance in human
affairs. 177 And the IFIs' mandates are best interpreted as charges to the IFIs
to adopt policies which encourage and facilitate state programs that not only
increase opportunity and decrease risk, but that work specifically to spread
what I have here been calling "ethically exogenous" opportunity and risk.178
The program/policy and opportunity/risk axes form four quadrants
according to which we can readily classify and interpret a great many
opportunity- and risk-spreading state programs encouraged and facilitated by
174. See Hockett, Gestalt-Sivitch, supra note 1
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. On the benefit side, finance amounts to opportunity in the quite literal sense that it
enables people through the exercise of diligence to "make real" their potentially value-
adding ideas. In effect, this is precisely what micro-loans, small business loans, corporate
finance and venture capital finance all amount to. On the burden side, finance amounts
to a means of trading, sharing, or more thinly spreading what would otherwise be thickly
concentrated risk. This is one reason why insurance companies are considered to be
financial institutions. It is also quite clearly observed not only in derivative and other
hedging markets, but even in the more garden variety corporate securities markets
themselves, a principal role of which is to assist firms' owners in diversifying their
investments and thus lessening their financial risks. Seegeneral)
, 
ROBERT HOCKETr, CASES
AND iMATERIALS ON FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(2008).
178. See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, spra note 1; see also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1.
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specific IFI policies. 79 So, for example, land reform, basic health, literacy and
education programs carried out within states are of course ethically exogenous
opportunity spreading programs. And the World Bank in particular has
developed policies in favor of encouraging and indeed facilitating such
programs. 80 The Fund's and the Bank's developing interest in eradicating
corruption and even in fostering democracy, both in governments and in firm
governance, can likewise be so interpreted.' 81 Social insurance programs run
by states, of course, amount to ethically exogenous risk spreading programs.
And the IFIs' recent attentions to "social safety nets" amount to IFI policy
developments along these lines.' 82 And I have been proposing additional,
market-based such programs in other venues. 183
Where, then, do the SOP suggestions of Part IV fit in here? Well, to a
degree they straddle the boundaries, occupying portions of all four quadrants,
on the one hand. That would seem to render them especially good candidates
for IFI concern. For it means they are cognizable by the IFI's from all
vantage-points of their mandates. These observations are perhaps most
obvious in respect of the opportunity/risk axis, where the straddle is, in a
sense, conceptually inevitable. In respect of the program/policy axis, on the
other hand, the straddle is contingent. It is contingent specifically upon our
pending decision post-Part IV as to how we wish to proceed. I will
accordingly say just a bit here about the opportunity/risk axis, leaving the
matter of program and policy to a fuller consideration of how best to proceed
below, in Section B.
What I mean in speaking of an opportunity and risk straddle in the case
of the SOP plans of Part IV here is fairly simple. It is that spreading shares in
globalization-benefited firms to faultless outsourced Peters is to spread both
ethically exogenous risk and ethically exogenous opportunity. It is to spread
such risk because Peter no longer need bear this risk-which is, again, by
hypothesis ethically exogenous' 84-- alone. The risk to people like Peter-who
might, when too old fully to retool, unforeseeably lose income in
consequence of the sudden hiring of desperate Pauls who can work for much
lower pay in much poorer countries with much lower costs of living-is now
179. See Hockett, Gestalt-S'itch, se pra note 1; see also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 1; Hockett,
Macro-Hedging, sispra note 1; Robert Hockett, Gaming as Microinsurance: How and Why to
Regulate, not Eliminate, Online Gambling (working paper, on file with author).
180. See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, snpra note 1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See stipra note 179.
184. That's what we mean when we call him "fauldess." See supra, Part 1 and Part 11.C.
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mitigated. It is mitigated by compensation paid Peter by Mary, who has
benefited by luck and is now made to share some of her windfall gains. So
the presently concentrated burdens wrought by globalization are de-
concentrated. They are spread. And they are spread precisely by spreading a
hitherto likewise concentrated benefit-the windfall gains gleaned by Mary.
The aforementioned benefit spreading, which here takes the form of
share- spreading, also amounts to a form of ethically exogenous opportunity-
spreading. It is opportunity-spreading in the straightforward sense that to
own shares in firms that benefit by globalization is to own shares in future
profits. Peters will glean future dividends, capital gains, or both, which they
would not have gleaned before. They might even use some of these to
finance "retooling" of themselves through vocational training, if young
enough to be able to employ the new skills. Share-spreading of this sort also
is ethically exogenous opportunity- spreading. It is so in the straightforward sense
that it is financed, in effect, by recouping some of the windfall gains gleaned
by the Marys.
The SOP structures described over Part IV, then, amount to means of
facilitating the sharing across persons of ethically exogenous opportunity and
risk. The sharing accordingly occurs in a manner that both increases the
number of stakeholders in, and decreases the injustices wrought by, global
economic integration. It is therefore precisely the sort of thing I have shown
elsewhere to fall well within the bailiwick of proper IFI concern. 185
But now, what form of concern? How is the concern to be manifest? Are
the SOP arrangements described in Part IV best viewed as primarily a matter
of state "program," which IFIs should adopt "policies" to encourage and
perhaps facilitate? Or are we instead here considering the sort of program
that either must, or at any rate would best be, itself administered by some
transnational institution or institutions, including one or more of the IFIs?
That question takes us straight to more direct consideration of precisely what
role the IFIs are apt to play in any global SOPs program. And here I incline
to think "path dependence," determined in part by already existent analogical
precedent and in part by an already developing institutional backdrop, is apt
to play an influential role.
185. See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, snpra note 1; see also Hockett, Three Pillars, srnpra note 1.
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B. How They Are Programmatically Implicated
There seems no question, then, but that the IFIs both (a) have good
reason, and (b) are authorized, to take interest in the prospect of a global
SOPs program. Hence our principal remaining question is what form that
interest should take. Given the particular interests at stake and the
institutional environment already in place, I suspect that the principal role for
the IFIs will be the following: first, inventive and advocative; second,
coordinative; and third, monitory. In the remainder of this Part, I will explain
what I mean here and why I believe it most likely. But I shall also, in keeping
with the broader aims of this Article, expressly leave open the prospect that
IFI involvement might take some other shape.
The IFIs, then, first should undertake to design, and urge their members
domestically to initiate, OutsourceSOPs and perhaps even CitSOPs as well.
Second, they should propose, host and facilitate international cooperation in
coordinating SOP policies across jurisdictions, in a manner encouraging safe
participation and diversification of holdings by SOP beneficiaries. And third,
the IFIs should add, to their already active surveillance agendas, the regulation
and monitoring of SOP trusts. They should do this with a view to protecting
beneficiaries and third parties from familiar forms of exploitation and
expropriation by opportunistic fiduciaries, pursuant to their now accustomed
role in facilitating coordinated finance-regulatory policies worldwide.
In employing ordinal-"first," "second," "third"-terminology here, I
intend to convey more than merely expository ordering. I mean literal,
programmatically temporal ordering as well. That is to say, I think the order
of exposition not only heuristically natural, but also to replicate that of the
optimal sequencing of IFI involvement in any global SOPs agenda. I will
explain why as I proceed in explaining my position here.
First let us turn to design and advocacy. It might of course be wondered
why the IFIs need design or advocate here at all. Do individual member
states-particularly those with substantial populations of those I have been
calling "Peters"-not face sufficient incentive already to institute systems of
OutsourceSOPs and even CitSOPs? After all, it is their Peters who are
unjustly deprived of work opportunities by outsourcing. It is their treaties
that are making this possible. And it is their function to facilitate exogenous
opportunity and risk sharing among their own citizens. What need for the
IFIs to "incentivize," then?
Furthermore, are states not, in addition to being already adequately
incentivized, also perfecdy capable of implemenling SOP programs on their
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own, state by state? For again, after all, it is for them themselves to encourage
SOP financing on the part of firms by trimming their tax take from firms that
do so, or by conditioning trade liberalization on share issuance to outsourced
employees as described in Part IV. Moreover, it is presumably they who will
have to determine who among their citizenries qualifies for the benefit, as is
currently the case with more familiar adjustment assistance. 86 And finally,
there is already an extensive infrastructure of bank trust departments and
investment companies-mutual funds in particular-that seem most likely to
supply the SOP-requisite trust accounts; 87 and these operate under domestic
regulatory arrangements.
The reply to all of these questions and observations is of course yes. And
that is quite helpful to know for at least one reason we can immediately
concede. Namely, that states can begin designing and instituting such
programs as these to render globalization more unambiguously good for their
citizenries, without having to wait for others to do so. 88 And, that they will
play a critical role, per familiar principles of subsidiarity, even in any eventual
global SOPs infrastructure. 189 Nevertheless, things are more complicated than
I have thus far suggested in a number of respects. And it is precisely these
complications that constitute the principal points of needed entry for the
IFIs.
For one thing, most simply and generally, it will be much better for the
cause of sustainable globalizalion for all states with sizable populations of
Peters to design and institute SOP-type arrangements of the kind sketched
above in Part IV. That is so both for the justice- and prudence-based reasons
laid out in Part I and Part II.C, and for the more globalization-specific
reasons discussed just above in Part V.A. "More" is straightforwardly
"better" where just distribution is concerned.190 And the IFIs, whose first
mission is to facilitate precisely such continued globalization as mentioned,
bear a natural interest in encouraging members to do domestically what is
necessary to further that transnational purpose. This is indeed precisely why
they encourage, as noted above in Part V.A, the development of "social safety
186. See snpra, note 141, and accompanying text.
187. We are not apt to wish to "reinvent the wheel" here.
188. Hence my proposals in Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans?, sapra note 1.
189. We might even analogize to the federal and state "partnerships" familiar to child health
care programs in the United States. See id.
190. For more on the straightforward betterness I have in mind here, see Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, snpra note 1. For a formal proof of the claim, see Robert Hockett, Market
Competeness, Market Nentrali ,, and Ethicaly Cognizable Effideng: An Ordinal Equivalence
Theorem (working paper, on file with author).
3:357 (2008)
HeinOnline -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 421 2008
422 ViTginia Law & Business Review 3:357 (2008)
nets" such as the OutsourceSOP and CitSOP would themselves partly
constitute.
Furthermore, within some polities Marys might be as influential as Peters,
if not indeed moreso. And their perceived self-interests might not be what
most of us would call "enlightened." Moreover, many Peters in many
jurisdictions might well believe that their only remedy from continued
outsourcing is to push back against globalization itself. They might not
realize, that is, that there are more direct and more carefully tailored, less
globalization-threatening and "baby out with the bathwater" means of
addressing their justified complaints.
The IFIs can accordingly serve a most useful agenda-setting or -
influencing role within polities where our "everyone gains," Part IV SOP
solution has not yet been hit upon or gone mainstream. By adding a salutary
voice within polities, then, and moreover by adding an impartial, transnational
voice, the IFIs can play a critical role in the popularizing and spreading of
SOP programs worldwide. That, again, in turn will facilitate the stable and
steady continuance of distributively just market-integration to which the IFIs
are, so to speak, constitutionally committed.191
It also bears emphasis that some of the assumptions embedded in the
questions with which I introduced the present discussion require more
nuance. At least that is so if the questions are not to be misleading. And this
takes us directly to the second, more than merely advocative role that the IFIs
appear likely to play in connection with the instituting of any global SOPs
program.
Here, then, is the proverbial rub. It is true enough that national
governments might be doing the actual taxbreak-encouraging or conditional
requiring of SOP-financing by firms. And it is true that they will also in all
likelihood be doing the monitoring of claimants to beneficiary status of SOP
programs, with a view to those claimants' bona fide 'faultlessy outsourced"
status. Finally, it also is true that there is already an extensive, privately
provided infrastructure of bank trust departments and investment companies
in place-an infrastructure apt to be utilized in the creation of SOP trust
accounts and SOP beneficiary accounts. But, owing to the success of IFI-
facilitated global financial market integration itsef, what individual states do vis
A vis the financing of firms and the operating of financial intermediaries
increasingly affects persons residing beyond their borders. 192
191. That is to say, by dint of their mandates as enshrined in their constitutive documents-
their enabling treaties.
192. See, e.g., HAL Scorr, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 863-88 (14th ed. 2006).
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General Motors, Microsoft, Unisys, and so on, are not owned solely by
American Marys. Nor are Daimler, Phillips or Unilever owned solely by
Europeans, or Toyota and Sony by Japanese. Firms increasingly offer and sell
their shares worldwide. And the holding of savings and investment
portfolios, too, increasingly happens across borders. 193 This all means, among
other things, that what a particular state encourages or requires firms over
which it has jurisdiction to do increasingly impacts non-nationals as well as
nationals.
And that in turn means, not only that non-national Marys over whom a
government lacks jurisdiction might feel differently than nationalMarys about
having to share gains with national Peters-especially if it is easier for
national Peters to gain beneficiary status than, say, Mary's nation's Peters. It
also means that nationally and non-nationally located firms can fare differently
according as Marys "vote with their feet"-their investment moneys.
Differential faring of this sort would be inimical to the ideals of global market
integration. What is more, differences in treatment of primary-issuing firms
and financial intermediaries nation by nation would tend to discourage global
diversification of holdings. And such diversification is a necessary predicate
to optimal asset security among the world's shareholders.
I trust that I need not continue with this line of observation. You get the
idea. For a global SOPs plan to be widely experienced and appreciated as fair
and to work optimally, it will have to treat all global Peters and Marys as close
to alike and impartially as possible. That means that there is a role for
impartial international organizations to coordinate efforts among nations, to
harmonize substantive standards and procedural implementation. And this is,
of course, yet another role that the IFIs-especially the IMF now-already
play.194
Insofar as globalization is truly a global community project, then, and
insofar as this project implicates something like a global SOPs program to
smooth and thus underwrite the project's continuance, it calls for coordinative
assistance given such programs by the same institutions as assist with
coordinating the other policies, programs and processes of global integration.
In the present context, that means the IFIs. So, in addition to advocating the
coordinated adoption of SOP programs by member states, and supporting
the design and fine-tuning of such programs through their research and
related expertise, the IFIs will do something else. That is they will constitute
natural fora for the coordinating itself-the coordinating of substantive
193. Id.
194. See Hockett, Three Pillars, siopra note 1.
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standards, implementary and operational strategies, and the like. They will be
doing this with respect to the SOP form of global social insurance, that is,
precisely what they do now already in respect of global finance- regulatory
architecture. 195 This takes us straight to the third, final "phase" of what I
think the most likely course of sequenced IFI involvement.
Perhaps above all else, the kind of coordinating that many of the IFIs and
especially the IMF do now is the coordinating of regulation. 196 The financial
services industry, as we have long known, is particularly vulnerable to
occasional outbreaks of mutually reinforcing hyper-speculative and
opportunistic behavior on the part both of fiduciaries and of others who
trade on their own accounts. Some of these are people who sometimes find
the temptation to make a quick buck, typically through sophisticated means
not readily detectable even by experienced regulators let alone uninformed,
inexpert clients. And when such things happen, not only can innocent
parties' life savings be wiped out with little more than a keystroke or two, but
systemic third party effects can be devastating as well.197
It is precisely for these reasons-the special vulnerability of inexpert
clients, the systemic effects on the wider economy and thus uninvolved third
parties, and the high money stakes-that even many traditionally anti-
regulatory, politically "conservative" personages recognize the need for at
least financial regulation.198 Such reasons also, together with the need to
coordinate regulatory strategies in a world whose financial markets are now
integrated even while regulation remains national and poly-centric, underwrite
the role of the IFIs in researching, developing and facilitating the smooth
operation of the global finance-regulatory architecture.
You see where this is going. A global SOPs program would make
substantial shareholders of a vastly large number of people worldwide. Firms
worldwide will increasingly come to be owned, in varyingly sized parts, by
virtually all of the world's adult inhabitants. Their shares will be held and
managed by financial intermediaries, which will accordingly hold power and
195. This complementarity of social insurance and financial regulation is treated more
fulsomely in Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 1, and ROBERT HOCKETT, FINANCE,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming, 2009).
196. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1.
197. Witness, by way of particularly recent example, current turmoil across financial markets
generally rooted in the particular decisions of a few overeager subprime mortgage lenders
several years ago. Such examples can of course be proliferated from decade to decade.
198. Even Ronald Reagan, the fellow who brought you "government is not the solution,
government is the problem," is said to have extolled the virtues of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). See JoEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET vii (2d ed. 2006).
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face temptations of kinds quite familiar but on a scale vastly larger than
before. A global shareholder society will also be a global risk-bearing
society-a society of persons at risk of financial predation. To build such a
society, in the end, is worth the risk; but only insofar as the risk can be
mitigated along lines developed by domestic authorities over the past fifty
years or so.
The final role of the IFIs in connection with any global SOPs program,
then, will be a straightforward extension of--or rather, augmentation of-
what probably is by this point their best known role. In a world that
increasingly comes to look like a global shareholder society-in which
national citizens transnationally hold shares in transnational firms in accounts
with transnationally operating financial intermediaries-the IFIs will have to
assist national regulators in protecting their shareholder citizens, as well,
therefore, as the global financial system qua system. When we get there, of
course, things and the existing IFI, generally, will look much as they do now,
only more so.
CONCLUSION: OUR FORTHCOMING GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER
SOCIETY
We have covered a good bit of ground here, no doubt more than enough
to warrant leaving off for the present. Perhaps ironically, however, we have
only just begun. For as mentioned a number of times already over the course
of this Article, the aim has been more exploratory than flatly advocative.
The processes of global market integration have been remarkably
successful to date, particularly when measured against the backdrop of those
world conditions that visionary world leaders like Maynard Keynes and Harry
White embarked upon in the mid- 1940s. 199 Those processes also have
brought many benefits to many people, and continue to do so-including not
only many of the world's hitherto most disadvantaged people, but indeed also
its most unjustly disadvantaged people at that.
Global market integration also is occasioning losses-including, again,
unjust losses-as well. Until we get serious about developing means of
addressing these, the world is apt not only to remain less just than it could be,
but also to remain prey to backsliding into the unsatisfactory direction from
whence we have but recently come.20 0 It seems clear that the best means of
199. See Hockett, Mission Creep, supra note 1.
200. Two words for you here: "Smoot-Hawley." The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was passed by
the U.S. Congress on June 17, 1930. 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1930). The act is thought to have
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addressing these losses-"best" as measured both against our motivating core
ideals and against our feasibility-constraining endowment sensibilities as
discussed above in Part I and Part I.C-are financial in nature.
It also seems clear that, just as the project of globalization is a global
project, so is the project of rendering globalization more just and sustainable a
global project. It is a project in which global institutions must play a critical
role. And since it is preeminently a financial project, it is a project in which
our global financial institutions and global financial architecture in particular
will play a critical role.
The precise contours of these roles will of course ride in part on the
contours of the programs we ultimately devise. I hope in the foregoing pages
at least to have sketched out a plausible direction in which that devising might
proceed.
By way of a last, parting thought for the moment, think of what it will
mean should we succeed. We will have attained a goal that has long been the
dream not only of internationalists, but even of more domestically oriented
advocates of a just and sustainable economic order. We will have laid the
foundations for a global society where all members partake, as part-owners,
of the means by which prosperity is generated. There will be no more need
of division between classes. Nor will there be need of "protectionist"
resurgences or Seattle-style riots. "Globalization" will again be embraceable
by idealists, not just by "offshoring" entrepreneurs in search of extractable
surplus.
All of us, long have been, like it or not, global stakeholders. I believe we
shall all make that inescapable stakeholding not only more bearable, but more
just and indeed more fulfilling, by making ourselves global shareholders as
well.
ushered in a period of protectionism that choked the global economy, hence prolonging
the Great Depression and bringing about World War 1I. The act raised U.S. tariffs on
imported goods to record levels and other countries retaliated agains the United States
with dramatic increases in their tariffs. See, e.g., BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, MAKING SENSE
OF SMOOT-HAwLEY (2005).
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